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THE PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF
DISCLOSING STANDARD TERMS
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan†
Although assent is the doctrinal and theoretical hallmark
of contract, its relevance for form contracts has been drasti-
cally undermined by the overwhelming evidence that no one
reads standard terms.  Until now, most political and academic
discussions of this phenomenon have acknowledged the truth
of universally unread contracts, but have assumed that even
unread terms are at best potentially helpful, and at worst
harmless.  This Article makes the empirical case that unread
terms are not a neutral part of American commerce; instead,
the mere fact of fine print inhibits reasonable challenges to
unfair deals.  The experimental study reported here tests the
hypothesis that when a policy is disclosed as a boilerplate
contract term, it appears more legitimate, both morally and
legally, than if it is disclosed elsewhere—even if the term
would be plausibly subject to legal challenge in either case.
Subjects from an in-person campus sample were randomly
assigned to read about a consumer policy communicated ei-
ther as a standard term in a form contract, or as a company
policy available on the firm’s website.  They were more likely
to think that harsh policies were legally enforceable, and mor-
ally defensible, when the policies were in the fine print—and
were more likely to object to a policy that was publicly availa-
ble but not within the standard terms.  Disclosing onerous
terms up front does not affect consumer choice ex ante but
creates a problematic assumption of enforceability when the
terms turn out to be troublesome ex post.  These results were
also replicated using a sample of subjects from the general
population.  If correct, this phenomenon presents a substantial
challenge to the traditional economic analysis of private bar-
gaining in contract.  The Article concludes with an analysis, in
light of these findings, of doctrinal, political, and market mech-
anisms for policing unfair terms.
† Professor of Law & Psychology, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I
am indebted to David Hoffman, Jill Fisch, Jean Galbraith, Jeff Rachlinski, and
Clay Gillette, and Richard Brooks for comments on an earlier draft.  I also received
helpful feedback from participants in faculty workshops at Penn, NYU, UVA, UNC,
Cardozo, Brooklyn, and Cornell law schools, as well as from participants in the
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies and the North American Workshop on
Private Law Theory.  Finally, I am grateful for the superb research assistance of
Kristin Firth, Penn Law ‘16.
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INTRODUCTION
Serious observers of modern contracting concede that the
current state of the world is disclosure overload.1  Most people
interact with contract law almost exclusively via contracts of
adhesion—take-it-or-leave-it deals between firms and individu-
1 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer
Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 595–605 (2014) (responding to the problem of
“search costs” engendered by the volume of terms and disclosures available to
individual buyers.); see also Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R.
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form
Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2014) (finding that customers visited the terms
and conditions pages at rates around one-tenth of one percent).
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als.  For almost all of our legally binding agreements, we know
there are standard terms that govern the peripheral features of
our deals, and we do not know what those terms say.2  Mean-
while, the doctrine of assent, the legal and philosophical core of
contract, prevents contract liability when parties had no reason
to know that they were bound.3  This puts modern contract law
in an uneasy position: What does it mean to take assent seri-
ously when no one knows what they are assenting to?  For now,
courts treat each set of standard terms as the proper object of a
party’s careful attention, and enforce a term if (and only if) the
non-drafting party has explicit, specific notice of its existence.4
The requirement of disclosure in consumer contracting is ut-
terly uncontroversial.5 And yet, disclosure requirements lead
inexorably to more disclosures.  The resulting state of affairs is
a deluge of unreadable terms that courts and policymakers
simultaneously require and regret.
This Article has two related goals: first, to show empirically
that disclosing terms has perverse effects on parties’ behavior
in the shadow of the law; and second, to make the case that
disclosure requirements undermine the most promising mech-
anisms for policing unfair terms.  This analysis presents a sub-
stantial challenge to the traditional economic analysis of
private bargaining in contract. Economic theories of con-
tracting are built on the value of information, a value that is
2 See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu,
“Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis
of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 46 (2015)
(reporting that a majority of respondents did not know whether a contract in-
cluded an arbitration clause even when they had just read the contract in
question).
3 See, e.g., L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 85 (1937) (“The answer to the question of
Hadley v. Baxendale (where shall we stop?) must inevitably be as  complex as the
answer to the question (where shall we begin?) which is implicit in the law of
mutual assent . . . .”); but see Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent:
Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1830–31
(2004) (“In contrast to the mutual assent approach, the no-retraction principle
developed here suggests that when two parties attach different, but equally plau-
sible, meanings to their agreed-upon contractual obligation, the absence of con-
sensus would not negate any liability.”).
4 See, e.g., Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for
Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in
Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 515–17 (2008) (reviewing the
practice of “hiding” onerous terms, and citing to case law on the unenforceability
of hidden terms).
5 For a more comprehensive discussion on the ways that the law has viewed
disclosure rules, see generally Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L.
REV. 565, 574–93 (2006).
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typically vindicated via disclosure requirements.  By contrast,
the arguments presented here are more of a piece of the broad
literature on the dubious utility of disclosure for consumer
protection—but this Article goes further, and turns the stan-
dard inquiry on its head.  Empirical scholarship has been uni-
formly skeptical of the benefits of disclosure,6 but even those
analyses have missed something in their one-sided framing of
the problem.  We should be asking not just whether there is
any benefit to disclosure in consumer contracting, but also
whether there is any harm.
The treatment of consumer contracting elaborated here be-
gins with the now-uncontroversial fact of universal non-reader-
ship.7  Starting from the premise that no one reads their form
contracts, I argue that we could reasonably conclude that there
is no communicative distinction between ten pages of boiler-
plate and zero pages of boilerplate.  The only difference between
contracts with and without disclosure is the fact, rather than
the function, of the paperwork, fine print, attestations of read-
ership, “I agree” clicks, and hyperlinked privacy policies.  If
terms and conditions have no practical value to non-drafting
parties, we should doubt that they are making contract law
better.
The next logical step in the inquiry is to ask, what if the
terms are actually making things worse?  Let us assume that
the presence of extra text does not increase a party’s under-
standing of the deal.  Does that mean that the text has no effect
on her behavior at all? In an era of unprecedented disclosure
overload, we have neglected to ask what most people think of
all the unread terms—do they think they are supposed to read
them?  Do they think they are supposed to ignore them?  Do
they think the legal system takes them seriously?
In fact, these kinds of questions are very much a part of the
contracts literature outside of the consumer context.  Scholar-
ship and commentary on consumer contracting has largely
overlooked the copious research demonstrating that contracts
have social meaning apart from their content.8  We have at
least fifty years of empirical evidence of strong moral and social
6 See, e.g., Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 1, at 17–21
(showing that disclosure readership effectively does not exist).
7 See, e.g., id. (showing overwhelming non-readership for a sample of online
contracts).
8 But see, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 35–51 (Princeton University Press 2014) (arguing that
consumer contracts derogate the democratic rule of law).
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norms around contracting,9 including the special “veneer of
legality”10 of policies embodied in contract.  That research has
largely been about contracts with salient interpersonal or
reputational stakes—contracts exchanged between long-term
commercial partners, or contracts between individuals for the
sale of land or goods, for example.  But there is some evidence
that contracts have social and moral weight even for one-shot
small-scale transactions (i.e. sales) between individuals and
corporations.11
The normative status of promissory morality is disputed.12
On the one hand, moral norms may keep contracts on track
and out of (costly) court.  In the context of consumer con-
tracting, though, the terms may deter complaints, exit, or even
legal challenges, precisely because they appear morally and
legally legitimate in a way that non-contractual policies do
not.13  This is the motivating concern, and the empirical focus,
of this Article.  If individuals think that contract terms have
legal and moral force, then the mere fact that unfair terms have
been disclosed via contract may make consumers worse off by
deterring their legitimate objections.
The experimental study reported here offers a case study
for precisely this concern.  Participants in a questionnaire
study considered the case of a customer taken aback by an
unusual fee—in one case, for example, a $200 “processing fee”
charged for renters who received parking tickets.  When the fee
was described on the company website, separate from the con-
tract transaction between the renter and the agency, readers
were skeptical.  They thought the fee was unfair, bad business,
and maybe even illegal.  But for participants who read about
the fee in the context of the form contract—as a term embedded
9 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral
Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1567–70 (2011) (discussing
moral opposition to strategic default in mortgage contracts); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
& David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1013–18 (2010)
(identifying breach as a moral violation that causes affront).
10 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclo-
sure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 740 (2011) (noting that one downside of over-
disclosure is the possible false signal to readers that the disclosure has a pre-
sumption of legal force).
11 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 9, at 1562–73 (reporting results of an R
experimental survey study of attitudes toward mortgage companies).
12 See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Promise and Contract,
120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 740–43 (2007) (discussing the importance of a culture of
moral character for the social and legal order).
13 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia,
112 MICH. L. REV. 883, 885 (2014) (“The social experience of receiving fine print is
annoying, alienating, and even degrading.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 6  9-NOV-17 9:54
122 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:117
in the unread fine print—they viewed it more favorably.  Their
responses suggest that they would be less likely to bring a legal
action but also more likely to regard the firm as a reasonable
counterparty.  Such a response has deep implications for the
evolution of case law in consumer contracting and for the plau-
sibility of a functioning market for contract terms.
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I describes the
legal, political, and cultural status quo vis-à-vis consumer con-
tracting in terms of widespread and undertheorized ambiva-
lence.  Courts, legislatures, and individuals all understand the
problem of unreadability, but their normative and prescriptive
statements are often jarringly dissonant—attending to the im-
possible demands of boilerplate in some cases and ignoring it
in others, with real consequences for consumers.  Part II de-
scribes the traditional economic analysis of standard terms, an
approach that views disclosure as a low-cost means of facilitat-
ing deals that benefit both parties.  Evidence of non-readership
has not been ignored by the law and economics movement, and
more recent scholarship has identified more nuanced interven-
tions to rescue the promise of disclosure for consumer con-
tracting.  Part III describes a converging body of empirical
research on contracts, research that has yet to be brought to
bear in a sustained way on contracts of adhesion.  Empirical
explorations of the psychology of contracts have explored two
parallel findings: individuals take contracts very seriously as
moral obligations, and individuals believe that the legal and
moral implications of contracting instantiate at the formal mo-
ment of assent, however thin or one-sided.  This research lends
itself to a novel understanding of the relationship of consumers
to their unread standard terms—it suggests that they may take
terms seriously as legal and moral obligations even when the
contract’s procedural and substantive fairness are clearly in
doubt.  Part IV presents the results of an experiment testing the
differential effects of company policies embedded within form
contracts versus those that are posted and available but not
explicitly contractual.  When policies—like fees, waivers of lia-
bility, dispute resolution processes, etc.—are in contracts, they
receive greater deference and are judged more favorably than
those same policies disclosed outside of contract.  Part V con-
siders the implications for political and legal approaches to
policing unfair terms.
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I
LAW OF FINE PRINT: TAKING STANDARD TERMS SERIOUSLY
This Part reviews both the straightforward doctrine of con-
sumer contracting, as well as the evidence of what I describe as
a growing ambivalence toward standard terms.
I reiterate at the outset of this discussion that I am assum-
ing that meaningfully increasing readership is neither desira-
ble nor practical.  There are serious scholars who appear to
disagree,14 but I am setting those arguments aside for the pur-
poses of this Article.  Perhaps the most influential paper in
support of the no-reading premise is from Omri Ben-Shahar
and Carl Schneider, arguing that reading all the terms and
disclosures is literally not compatible with a minimally accept-
able level of economic and social activity.15  Reading is costly,16
and most terms are very, very low-stakes17—the documented
proliferation of terms over the last fifty years at least suggests
the declining marginal relevance of each additional disclosed
term.18  The probability that reading a given term will change
any measurable outcome for the consumer is vanishingly
low.19  Most people should not read most terms, because the
cost of reading is greater than its expected value.  Furthermore,
aggregating across consumers, there is no evidence that a
small number of diligent readers discipline the market.20  This
14 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 553 (suggesting a warning-box R
method of alerting consumers of unexpected terms).
15 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10, at 711–18. R
16 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, ProCD v Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in
Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1185–87 (2010) (arguing that
providing terms after purchase is preferable because reading terms is so onerous).
See also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 540, 560–62 (2008) (estimating that
the average reader would require 154 hours of reading time dedicated to privacy
policies alone, a cost of over $2,000).
17 See, e.g., Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence of the Relationship Between
Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168.1 J. INSTITU-
TIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 124, 134 (2012) (citing as one of the “typical factors” of
low readership the “low stakes of the exchange”).
18 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10, at 737–42 (arguing that R
the cost of terms ought to include the overall readership loss as a function of each
additional term in a contract).
19 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Con-
tract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 15 (2009) (“If we succeeded in reading the text
and understanding it, we are often struck by the remoteness of the contingencies
it covers – ones that we don’t expect to materialize, such that cost of figuring out
and improving the terms that apply to these contingencies is not worth it.”).
20 This is not to say that consumers have no effect on boilerplate.  They
almost certainly do, by public complaints, legal actions, online reviews, etc.
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is very well-trodden academic ground,21 and in the remainder
of the Article, I take non-readership, both descriptive and nor-
mative, as an irreversible fact.
A. Doctrine: Taking Unread Terms Seriously
In consumer contracting, the ritual of documentation and
provision of terms is essentially vestigial, at least as a form of
assent-inducing communication between the parties.  And yet,
the idea that some fine print could be readable undergirds the
doctrinal focus on assent.  Certainly as a matter of black letter
law, courts assess assent with respect to whether a party could
have read the term in question.22  Whether or not a company
policy that affects consumers is enforceable depends on
whether the consumers have adequate notice that the policy
exists: would the “reasonably prudent offeree”23 have had no-
tice and an “opportunity to read”?24  As such, the status of
unread terms is relatively straightforward; for almost any par-
ticular term, the non-drafting party is bound to the terms the
drafter prefers.25
The reasonable notice approach seems unassailable on its
face: if firms do not inform consumers that the deal includes
other terms, those terms cannot possibly be a part of the
deal.26  You cannot be deemed to have assented to a contract if
21 See, e.g., Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 1, at 22–28 (offer- R
ing evidence that the negligible fraction of readers did not reach the threshold for
market influence); see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 19 (“I have strong R
doubts whether a small subset of reader can induce the necessary discipline upon
the drafters of the standard form . . . .”).
22 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450–53 (7th Cir. 1996)
(deciding that a clickwrap agreement is enforceable because the plaintiff could not
purchase without seeing the link to the terms and conditions). See also Robert A.
Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 756 (2002) (arguing that
consumers are highly unlikely to read any terms that follow, but that as long as
they had an opportunity to do so—perhaps especially “in the quiet of their own
homes”—the particular terms should be enforced).
23 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002).
24 Id. at 31 (citing Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 260 (1901)).  See also
Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 11–12 (describing the legal approach to evaluating R
whether parties have had an opportunity to read, and recommending labels and
warnings instead of terms).
25 See generally Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine
Print in Contracts, 21 RAND J. ECON. 518, 519–22 (1990) (describing the legal
background of form contracts).
26 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 22, at 744 (“Theorists and judges generally R
have analyzed this problem by determining when the contract is formed. Most
reason that the contract is formed either when the consumer orders and pays for
the goods and the seller ships them, or when, after delivery, the prescribed ‘accept
or return time’ expires.  If the former, the new terms that arrive after formation of
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you do not have reason to expect its existence.27  Enforcing a
contract for terms known only to one party would be truly
laughable in the contracts canon—Dr. McGee cannot enforce
an agreement for an extra medical procedure on George Haw-
kins’s foot if he fails to mention it before George relents, even if
that is what the doctor had in mind when he was begging
George to let him perform the hand surgery.28  The Carbolic
Smoke Ball Company cannot require Mrs. Carlill to keep her
failed flu-fighting attempt a secret without including that provi-
sion in their advertisement.29  These would be unthinkable re-
sults—whole bodies of contract law (foreseeability,30
misunderstanding,31 and the Mirror Image rule,32 to name a
few) are premised on the notion that parties should not be
subject to liability they could not see coming.  To do so would
be to undermine our confidence in the benefit of the bargain.
All told, the insistence on notice and disclosure flows neatly
from the economic analysis.
In fact, it ought to be somewhat surprising that the doc-
trine of assent remains truly robust in the common law of
consumer contract.  Does it really make sense to ask whether
particular parties have “sufficient notice”33 that terms exist or
a reasonable opportunity to read them “to his heart’s con-
tent”?34  In their written opinions, judges seriously explore the
the contract are proposals for additions to the contract that do not become part of
the contract.”) (internal citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 20 (distinguishing between agreement to
terms and pressing “download” without more warning about the existence of
terms).
28 Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643–44 (N.H. 1926).
29 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256, 260–61 (1892).
30 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80
CAL. L. REV. 563, 566–68 (1992) (describing the longstanding focus of the foresee-
ability doctrine on the core understanding of the parties’ assent).
31 See, e.g., George E. Palmer, The Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract
Formation and Reformation Under the Restatement of Contracts Second, 65 MICH.
L. REV 33, 34–47 (1966) (describing the two types of misunderstanding and their
effects on the formation of contracts).
32 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the
Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of Section 2–207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1235
(1982) (describing the historical application of the mirror image rule to refuse
enforcement when courts were not clear that parties would have come to terms).
33 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002)
(asking whether a link to terms positioned to require scrolling down the webpage
was sufficiently available to put the user on notice).
34 See, e.g., In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00-C-1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *6
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (finding an arbitration clause enforceable in part because
“[t]he pop-up window containing the License agreement does not disappear after a
certain time period; so, the user can scroll through it and examine it to his heart’s
content”).
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question, for example, of whether the casual user of a website
should have known that there were terms of use and whether
that user could have learned those terms without too much
hassle.35  This is surely all but theoretical in a world in which
terms are always expected36 and never read; in fact, most peo-
ple recognize that changing the placement of the link or the size
of the font or the leisure with which consumers may peruse the
fine print has no practical effect on the either the likelihood or
the benefit of reading.37
B. Case Study of Assent Gone Awry: Clickwrap and
Browsewrap
When courts analyze assent for the purposes of determin-
ing enforceability, they drill down into the particular facts of
each website’s hyperlinked terms of service, or each vendor’s
modification by bill stuffer.  Take, for example, the growing
doctrine of browsewrap terms.38  In a browsewrap contract,
users encounter a link on a website called “Terms and Condi-
tions” or “Terms of Service.”39  They can continue using the site
or making a purchase without looking at the terms and without
indicating that they agree to the terms.  The enforceability of
browsewrap turns on notice—whether the link is conspicuous
35 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal.
2005) (striking down an arbitration clause in part because the term was included
as part of a “bill stuffer”).
36 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir.
1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (arguing that failure to warn customers over the phone of
additional terms arriving by mail is harmless because purchasers of such goods
always expect terms).
37 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website
Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 844 (2006)
(arguing that “methods of attracting attention to the terms, such as requiring bold
text or clicking after each term on the screen (or both), might increase reading,
but analogous strategies in the paper world have had mixed results, probably in
part because consumers, worn down by the contracting process, are unlikely to
be riveted to attention by such formalities”); cf. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at R
561 (noting the “blinding reality” that consumers do not read standard form
contracts but nonetheless proposing a warning label system with high-salience
terms in a standardized warning box).
38 Browsewrap agreements are distinguished from clickwrap agreements, in
which the terms are again offered via a link to another page, but users cannot
proceed without clicking “I Agree.”  Clickwrap agreements are almost always en-
forceable, on the grounds that the consumer received notice of the terms when
she had to click “I Agree” to move forward with the transaction.
39 See, e.g., Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still a Prerequisite for Contract For-
mation in Today’s E-Conomy?, 78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 265 (2003) (“A browse-wrap
agreement is an online contract that governs the use of a Web site but does not
require users of the site to affirmatively agree to the terms and conditions of the
contract.”).
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enough.40  Thus, the analysis of an unenforceable term often
looks like this (in this case, an action to refuse enforcement of a
browsewrap term on Zappos.com):
The Terms of Use is inconspicuous, buried in the middle to
bottom of every Zappos.com webpage among many other
links, and the website never directs a user to the Terms of
Use.  No reasonable user would have reason to click on the
Terms of Use . . . .41
In a suit against the genetic testing service 23andMe,
plaintiffs argued that they had not consented to arbitration.42
The court agreed that the Terms of Service link was not promi-
nent enough to make assent binding at purchase, but decided
that when plaintiffs registered for their accounts and had to
click “Yes, I have read and agree to the Terms of Service and
Privacy Statement,” they had enough notice to make the term
binding.43
These analyses do not just assume that terms are every-
where, or that reading is futile, or that consumers do not
choose on terms even if they know them.  They treat assent to
contracts of adhesion the same way they treat assent when
individual parties are negotiating a deal from scratch, investi-
gating the details of each manifestation. 44  In consumer con-
tracting, the duty to read is a legal fiction; the hoped-for
readership neither physically possible nor desirable, but this is
not the tack that courts take in their opinions.  Courts can and
do acknowledge the widespread failure to read, but an individ-
ual’s failure to read in any specific case is read against the
particulars of the context and the contract, not the cultural
background of disclosure overload.  The law of consumer con-
tracting, as it is interpreted by courts, is just the law of con-
tract, taking assent as seriously for boilerplate as for
negotiated deals.
All told, the law of assent in consumer contracting leaves
us in an uneasy place: anyone reading a judicial opinion in
contract law would have no reason to think that assent to
40 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Con-
tracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 487–91 (2002) (describing the
enforceability of browsewrap contracts).
41 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064 (D. Nev. 2012).
42 Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014).
43 Id. at *3.
44 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(opening with broad affirmation that traditional rules of assent apply equally to
online commerce).
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standard terms is dead.45  But surely analyzing assent to con-
sumer contracts in any kind of granular way is disingenuous
when we all know that consumer contracts are unreadable all
the time, no matter how close or how far the link to the “Privacy
Policy” is to the “Checkout” button.  The descriptive norm (no
reading) and the prescriptive norm (reading) may set up indi-
viduals, and possibly courts, for a confused analytic stance
with respect to contractual fairness.  In any given case, it is
easy to imagine how a party could and should have read the
fine print,46 and easy to create a story about the party’s failure
of reasonable prudence.47  The implications of the should-
have-read narrative are less coherent and more troubling, how-
ever, in an economic landscape overloaded with terms and with
a functional readership rate of zero.48
Even as courts pay little heed to the unrealistic demands of
reading, scholars and commentators alternately and simulta-
neously declare that we cannot read,49 but sometimes we can
read the important parts,50 but we should have read in this
45 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir.
2002) (ruling that Plaintiffs assented to standard terms of licensing agreement as
a matter of law).
46 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psycho-
logical Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA. L. REV. 1745, 1770 (2014).  In
particular, the psychological phenomenon of interest is “norm theory,” which
posits that some counterfactuals are easier to imagine than others—and that
when a counterfactual in which a person avoids a harm via his or her own actions
is particularly available, cognitively speaking, there is more blame and regret
associated with the harm. See generally Daniel Kahneman and Dale T. Miller,
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986)
(describing norm theory).
47 See, e.g., Robert P. Agans & Leigh S. Shaffer, The Hindsight Bias: The Role
of the Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, 15 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
439, 445–48 (1994) (explaining the bias in evaluating risky outcomes in hindsight
based on the salience of the bad outcome).
48 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 1, at 22 (finding that R
0.65% of online shoppers read the standard terms and conditions).
49 See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica Choplin, A License to Deceive:
Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 NYU J. L.
& BUS. 617, 673–76 (2009) (identifying social norms of non-readership); see also
Noah Feldman, When You Can’t Find the Fine Print (Or Read It), BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Mar. 28, 2016, 12:54 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-
28/when-you-can-t-find-the-fine-print-or-read-it [https://perma.cc/QZ7T-
WUU7] (“When was the last time you actually read the terms of service before
clicking ‘I agree’ on a website? Unless your answer is ‘never,’ I don’t believe you—
and I don’t think it’s your fault, either.”).
50 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1751 (evaluating the possibil- R
ity that individuals might “triage” their contract readership, and select to read the
most important terms).
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case,51 but readership is a necessary legal fiction,52 and so
forth.  Given the legal backdrop reviewed above, it should per-
haps not be surprising that, until very recently, the policy re-
sponses to widespread non-readership were about how to get
terms to be more readable and how to get consumers to read
them.53  This policy response is a direct result of the structure
of modern assent doctrine.  The common law frames the prob-
lem of assent to unread terms as either a failure of notice (term
is not enforceable) or as a failure to read (term is enforceable).
Consumer contracts do a bad job of communicating terms, and
consumers do a bad job of reading terms.  The natural re-
sponse to this problem is to try to help consumers understand
the important things in their contracts.  The focus has there-
fore been on the cognitive barriers to reading: limited fore-
sight;54 limited attention;55 limited literacy;56 limited
numeracy;57 and most of all, limited time.58  The cognitive ap-
proach is described in more detail in the next section; the point
here is to flag the relationship between the evolution of the
common law in this area and the nature of the response from
academic and policy commentators.
51 See Feldman, supra note 49 (explaining that Judge Diane Wood’s decision R
in a recent contracts case reaffirmed that “the inquiry into whether a contract had
been formed was case-specific”).
52 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 37, at 847 (“Disclosure laws in the context of R
e-standard-form contracts would mean that lawmakers were making an effort to
turn into something more meaningful the ‘apologetic’ legal fiction that consumers
understand and assent to the terms of their e-standard-form contracts.”).
53 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act
and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1003–05 (2012) (advocating for new and
better disclosure regimes including aggregated fee information).
54 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 222 (1995) (“Actors systematically give too light
weight to future benefits and costs . . . .”).
55 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and
Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 120–25 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000) (showing how the status quo bias affects form contracting).
56 See, e.g., Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract,
13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 235–42 (2002) (analyzing American illiteracy and its
relation to consumer form contracts).
57 See generally Sam Allgood & William Walstad, Financial Literacy and Credit
Card Behaviors: A Cross-Sectional Analysis by Age, 6 NUMERACY 3, 11–17 (2013)
(finding that deficits in financial literacy predicted costly credit card practices).
58 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10, at 705–09 (describing R
the absurd time commitment required to read all the standard terms faced by a
single consumer in a single day).
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II
TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE
Disclosure is at the core of any economic account of con-
tracting.  For at least 150 years, the implicit consensus of com-
mon law legal systems has reflected a vision of contracts as
financial instruments—tools of commerce.59  A central justifi-
cation for state intervention in contractual agreements is that
efficient exchange requires enforcement in order to permit par-
ties to rely on their deals when performance is sequential
rather than simultaneous.60  Contracts are tools of wealth cre-
ation, and the guarantor of mutual benefit is mutual assent to
the terms of the deal.  On this theory, we can be confident that
contracts are wealth-enhancing because people do not agree to
deals that make them worse off, and without agreement there
is no contract.  These efficient exchanges, secured and reliable
because of contract law, are at the heart of a robust market
economy.
A. Information: Imperfections and Asymmetries
For an economic analysis of modern contract law and the-
ory, disclosure is the bulwark against bad deals.  Economic
theory has long focused on the deep problem of imperfect infor-
mation for efficient bargains; choices based on imperfect or
asymmetric information disrupt markets.61  The solution, or at
least the goal of proposed solutions, is more information—
sharing information, making information easy to assimilate,
and facilitating information gathering.62  Boilerplate is infor-
mation, and in consumer contracts, it is all that there is to
know about the terms.  If the deal is the product, with terms as
features of the product, then a party who does not know the
59 See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L.
REV. 854, 856–59 (1978) (describing the evolution of contract law and situating it
within the classical formulation of contract as discrete transaction).
60 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980) (recounting the
history and scholarship of legal and economic justification for a state role in
contract enforcement).
61 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in
Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 461 (2002) (reviewing “some of the dramatic
impacts that information economics has had on how economics is approached
today, how it has provided explanations for phenomena that were previously
unexplained, how it has altered our views about how the economy functions, and,
perhaps most importantly, how it has led to a rethinking of the appropriate role
for government in our society”).
62 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 553 (proposing a “warning R
box” method of information disclosure).
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content of the drafter’s terms has imperfect information about
the product.63  The non-drafter has limited information while
the drafter has full information, and thus the parties transact
under conditions of asymmetric information. 64  Information
asymmetries lead, in theory, to a host of distributional and
efficiency maladies, which include, inter alia, exploitation,65
adverse selection,66 excessive risk aversion,67 and thin or
“missing” markets.68
In contracts, most of the theoretical and behavioral work
on information asymmetries has been about the effects of im-
perfect information on the distribution of the surplus—who
captures how much of the benefit of the bargain.69  Each party
has information about her own preferences and capacities, and
some additional information about the state of the world.  A
borrower who knows herself to be on the brink of unemploy-
ment might exploit that information asymmetry by borrowing
at a low interest rate; this is adverse selection.70  On the flip
side, lenders who fear this type of adverse selection may opt to
dramatically constrain their participation in a market that
could, with better information, be quite robust.71  To simplify
63 See generally Arthur Alan Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131,
144–55 (1970) (introducing the highly influential conception of contracts not as
an iterative list of rights and obligations, but as the constitutive content of the
product).
64 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 469–70 (identifying the problem of R
information asymmetry as a straightforward fact that “different people know dif-
ferent things”).
65 See generally Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Discouraging Rivals:
Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1301,
1301–07 (1995) (arguing that entrenched managers exploit their market power by
actively increasing information asymmetry).
66 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–92 (1970) (famously observ-
ing that the mere decision to sell a used car conveys information about the car’s
quality; sellers who select into the used car market are more likely to be selling
“lemons”).
67 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 477 (suggesting that contract in partic- R
ular offers a mechanism for risk-sharing, a response to risk aversion, that can
“help explain the perpetuation of seemingly inefficient contracts”).
68 See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 66, at 490–91 (showing that under conditions R
of imperfect information, markets may be thin or absent).
69 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, Incomplete Contracts with Asym-
metric Information: Exclusive Versus Optimal Remedies, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 523,
534–42 (2006) (describing the hydraulic relationship between information, bar-
gaining power, and contract surplus).
70 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1981) (describing adverse
selection).
71 See Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 470 (identifying adverse selection in employ- R
ment contracts as a particularly relevant example).
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egregiously in the interest of space, the solution to the imper-
fect information problem is more information.  As a policy mat-
ter, the prescription comes in a number of forms: incentivizing
information sharing (i.e., both search and disclosure), creating
opportunities for learning via direct observation, and drawing
inferences from the way that markets function.
It should seem natural to take this set of logic from the
economic theory of information asymmetries and turn to the
particular problem of form contracting—form contracting is
specifically about one party, the drafter, having information
about the terms of the deal that the other party does not.  On
closer inspection, though, consumer contracting via boilerplate
does not really implicate the kind of intractable private infor-
mation problems from traditional contracting and negotiations
analyses.  The information problem in contracts of adhesion is
perhaps better described as an attentional asymmetry.72  Both
parties have access to information but only one of them attends
to it.
On this view, the information asymmetry in consumer con-
tracting might actually seem to be the most susceptible to in-
formation solutions.  Parties must communicate terms if they
want them enforced, and all of the relevant information is cap-
tured in text made available to the less informed party.73  In-
deed the concept of “private information”74 here is barely
legible—what does it mean to have private information about
liability waivers or fees?  It is not “information” in the sense of
declarative facts unless it is disclosed—it only becomes a legal
fact upon disclosure to the counterparty.  In short, this does
not even look like a serious information asymmetry problem.
Both parties have access to information; at worst, it looks like
one party affirmatively rejects the opportunity to learn, at
72 There is a separate and also interesting information issue with disclosure
of peripheral terms that I will not address here. That is the issue of what kinds of
inferences the parties might draw about the core transaction (e.g., the quality of
the product for sale) given the terms.  Disclaimer of warranty is a term that, if
known, conveys information about the quality of the good.  In this analysis, I am
dealing only with terms qua terms—what implications do they have for the par-
ties’ legal obligations?
73 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresenta-
tion and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565,
593–94 (2006) (situating nondisclosure with misrepresentation within a model of
firm liability).
74 See, e.g., Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in
Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582,
586–95 (1992) (offering a standard analysis of negotiation and contracting when
the parties have “private information,” a model in which information is private
because the party without it cannot ascertain or discover it).
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which point we might be more sanguine about the distribu-
tional consequences of the asymmetry.
Courts and legislators have identified a number of prac-
tices that undermine the ideal of disclosure.  Presentation of
fees and interest rates must in some cases be disclosed in
particular forms—aggregating costs, for example, or calculat-
ing the total cost of borrowing over the life of the loan.  Con-
tracts must normally be comprehensible for a moderately-
educated consumer.75  The type must be legible.76  These inter-
ventions reduce the search costs77 for the non-drafting party—
a consumer can read the terms without consulting a dictionary
or a calculator or a magnifying glass.  Indeed, some of the core
doctrines of contract law are best explained as rules that en-
courage parties to share information.  Limiting damages to
those that are foreseeable, for example, encourages a party who
anticipates serious but nonobvious harms from breach to
speak up at the time of drafting.78  Refusing to enforce one
party’s earnest but idiosyncratic or narrow interpretation of a
term incentivizes parties with specific meanings to announce
themselves early.79
Addressing market failures by providing information is an
enormously appealing solution because it takes no position on
the parties’ preferences; it is not paternalistic.  All the more so
in the boilerplate context, because forcing disclosure does not
divest the disclosing party of any legal or moral claim she has
to surplus.  The problem, of course, is that the expected value
of the information in boilerplate is so low, and the cost of read-
ing it so high, that disclosing information is unrelated to receiv-
75 See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899,
903–04 (2006) (discussing the readability problem in contracts between lenders
and borrowers).
76 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 n.3 (1943) (explaining that
unread contracts are enforceable “provided the document is legible however small
the print”).
77 See, e.g., David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrele-
vance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 283 (1985) (“Consumers . . . would then be helped by disclosure that
reduced the costs to them of searching over product attributes.”).
78 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 103–05 (1989) (arguing that
the limitation on consequential damages is a penalty default intended to incen-
tivize parties to contract around the default when they have private knowledge
about their own risk of loss).
79 See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1819 (1991) (offering a normative
account of interpretive rules).
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ing or processing that information, which eradicates the most
straightforward path from information to market behavior.
B. The Law & Economics Approach to Non-Readership
The law and economics movement in legal academia, and
in contracts in particular, has been mindful of the effects of
non-readership on an economic model predicated on the ability
of informed consumers to effectuate their own preferences with
respect to their deals.  Perhaps the most influential response
from law and economics theory on this point is the model from
Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde’s 1979 paper, “Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information.”80  In that pa-
per, Schwartz and Wilde argue that the information problem of
boilerplate can be solved, at least in the sense of avoiding un-
fair or one-sided terms, when a fraction of consumers do read
and select on favorable terms.81  As Eric Posner says, “If sellers
cannot easily distinguish informed and uninformed consum-
ers, they cannot exploit the latter by charging them a higher
price.”82  This is a theory that suggests that information does
matter in the face of non-readership, because the vigilant mi-
nority will protect the free-riding majority by compelling firms
to compete on terms.
Much as the problem with an assumption of perfect infor-
mation is that the theory has limited utility when there is im-
perfect information (i.e., always), the Schwartz & Wilde model
is only useful if there is in fact a fraction of reading consumers
with enough market power to shape firm behavior.  All evidence
suggests that there is not.  The groundbreaking paper on this
work by Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David
Trossen assesses consumer access to a software license and
finds that about one in one thousand users click through—and
those who do click through stay on the page for a median of
thirty seconds.83  They ask whether these results could be in-
terpreted as “an informed-minority equilibrium” (of the
80 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
641–51 (1979) (showing that even if most non-drafting parties do not know the
terms of their agreements, as long as a fraction of consumers do read and select
on favorable terms, terms will not be unfairly one-sided).
81 Id. at 632.
82 Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 Yale L.J. 829, 844 (2003).
83 See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43
J. LEG. STUD. 1, 19–22 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 19  9-NOV-17 9:54
2017] DISCLOSING STANDARD TERMS 135
Schwartz & Wilde variety), and answer pretty unequivocally
no.84
As to any particular product feature or company policy, the
prospect of making disclosure work is very appealing.85  The
rationale is intuitive: people who are making choices make bet-
ter decisions when they have information about the content of
their choices.86  When people know the prices of similar goods,
they can choose the cheaper options; when they know the fla-
vor of ice cream in the carton, they can choose the flavor they
like better; when they know the size of the shirt, they can
choose the shirt that will fit.87  These are not the examples that
worry us in the form contract or disclosure context, though.
Some attributes of a product are highly salient no matter
what—consumers do not need reminders to shop on price or to
buy foods they like to eat.88  On the other hand, there are many
terms that do not affect choice but still affect ex post out-
84 Id. at 22–27.
85 There is currently very little reason to think that disclosure interventions in
contracts have had any meaningful protective/warning effect on consumer behav-
ior, and yet there is continued optimism in the face of dismal results.  For exam-
ple, financial regulation has been a prime target for disclosure rules:
“Information-based intervention has been proven feasible and effective in other
contexts . . . .  Perhaps the modern tendency to finance consumption with debt,
without a complete understanding of the future repercussions of such a tendency,
can be (at least partially) overcome through the provision of information.”  Oren
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. L. REV. 1373, 1420 (2004).  In the medical
world, informed consent, conflict of interest disclosures, and risk framing have
been a subject of debate for some time.  Kathryn Zeiler argued against caps on
medical malpractice damages with a disclosure solution: “By observing disclosed
contract terms, patients are able to update their beliefs about the likelihood that
they received compliant treatment.”  Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to
Information Disclosure: An Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 385, 395–96 (2005).  A prominent physician promoted disclosure as a
means of managing conflicts of interest in the New England Journal of Medicine:
“An advantage of disclosure is that it gives those who would be affected . . .
information they need to make their own decisions.”  Dennis Thompson, Under-
standing Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.  573, 575 (1993).
These examples are admittedly cherry-picked, chosen not to prove that everyone
believes in disclosure but that at least some people advocating disclosure-based
solutions do so on the basis that putting people on formal notice of non-salient
terms of a deal will actually affect their choices or the nature of their consent.
86 See, e.g., Dan Ariely, Controlling the Information Flow: Effects on Consum-
ers’ Decision Making and Preferences, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 233, 245 (2000) (show-
ing experiments linking the ability to select relevant information to high-quality
decision-making).
87 Of course, even these common sense examples are subject to challenge
from behavioral economics studies.  Many people choose expensive financial
products over identical cheap financial products; choice overload studies suggest
that knowing about a lot of jam choices leads to a decreased ability to choose the
jam that makes you happy.
88 See, e.g., William B. Dodds, Kent B. Monroe & Dhruv Grewal, Effects of
Price, Brand, and Store Information on Buyers’ Product Evaluations, 28 J. MARKET-
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comes.89  These are standard terms—arbitration clauses, pri-
vacy policies, license agreements, and so on.90  These terms are
arguably not susceptible to salience solutions.
As such, most contracts are comprised almost entirely of
terms that will never attract enough attention to change con-
sumer behavior.  The surprising omission from the existing
literature is any curiosity about the practical effects of these
irredeemably low-salience terms.  Even vocal opponents of dis-
closure overload “support the unexceptional notion that con-
sumers have an opportunity to read the terms of their
agreements.”91  Or, from other commentators citing the irrele-
vance of standard terms: “The notice requirement can perhaps
serve some socially valuable purpose, even if the vast majority
of consumers would ignore any notice. . . . Notice can also be
useful to a consumer who seeks to learn about his or her legal
rights after something has gone wrong with the transaction.”92
These comments suggest that the existence of the standard
terms is a fact of life not to be taken seriously—probably not
beneficial, but harmless.  The next Part looks to another litera-
ture—the research from psychology and behavioral econom-
ics—for the outlines of a plausible but distinct account.
The most recent set of information solutions for unread
contracts comes from behavioral economists.  One way to think
about their approach is that the goal is not to rely on a few fully
informed consumers, but on many partially informed consum-
ers.  The trick is to bring parties’ attention to the terms that
matter.  The insight is that if the parties only really need to
know a few important things, perhaps it is possible to meaning-
fully inform the non-drafting party.  There are a host of propos-
als from behavioral economics along the lines of how to make
terms more “salient,” or attention-getting.93  The responses
ING RES. 307, 312–17 (1991) (finding an expected relationship between price and
quality on willingness to purchase consumer goods).
89 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168
J. INST. THEOR. ECON. 94, 111–14 (2012) (finding that exposure to a one-sided term
in a software license agreement has no effect on likelihood to purchase the prod-
uct in question).
90 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2003) (“[P]roduct attributes that are
evaluated, compared, and implicitly priced as part of the purchase decision [are]
‘salient’ attributes and product attributes that are not evaluated, compared, and
priced as part of the purchase decision [are] ‘non-salient’ attributes.”).
91 Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 561. R
92 RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS 27-28, (Council Draft No. 2, 2015).
93 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 239–40 (1995) (describing multiple ways in which
terms are overlooked or underweighted at the time of drafting).
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hew closely to the problems: terms can be put into a warning
box.94  Terms can be simplified.95  The total price of a loan over
the life of the 30-year mortgage can be provided on the Good
Faith Estimate form.96  The costs of credit can be aggregated.97
In the most carefully calibrated of these approaches to the “no-
reading problem” to date, Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz argue
for disclosure triage: don’t worry about disclosing everything,
but rather worry about terms that are surprising and one-
sided.98  On their view, the question of surprise is meant to be
empirical: are consumers actually surprised by this unfavora-
ble term?99  If so, the authors would require firms to put the
terms into a pull-out box titled “Warning” or in a location other-
wise designed to draw attention.100
In sum, we can think of these economic analyses as offer-
ing two justifications for incentivizing, and ultimately enforc-
ing, boilerplate: either the standard terms affect consumer
choice directly, or the communication of some terms to some
people is enough to prevent exploitation.
From a law and economics perspective, the assessment of
disclosure solutions is appealing on both sides of the ledger—
information benefits the parties, of course, but also it is very
low-cost.  Requiring disclosure puts only a very minimal bur-
den on firms,101 requires almost no judicial or regulatory over-
sight,102 and does not otherwise interfere with parties’ private
94 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 553 (proposing unexpected R
terms be disclosed in a “warning box”).
95 See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Facebook Debuts Simplified Privacy Settings, WIRED
(May 26, 2010, 2:39 PM) (describing Facebook’s decision to simplify privacy set-
tings), http://www.wired.com/2010/05/facebook-debuts-simplified-privacy-set
tings/ [https://perma.cc/VTD8-3Z73].
96 See, e.g., Vanessa G. Perry & Pamela M. Blumenthal, Understanding the
Fine Print: The Need for Effective Testing of Mandatory Mortgage Loan Disclosures,
31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 305, 306 (2012) (“[The law requiring a good faith
estimate], initially interpreted as allowing lenders or brokers to provide the cost
information in any format they chose, was interpreted by the regulators in 2008 to
require a three-page standard form that included information about the interest
rate, payments, and other loan terms, as well as settlement service costs.”).
97 See Bar-Gill, supra note 85, at 1417–21. R
98 See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 579–80. R
99 Id. at 595–96 (introducing an empirical approach to expectability vs. sur-
prise in standard terms).
100 Id. at 576–79 (describing the warning box mechanism for disclosure).
101 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman and Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure
in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 106–08 (2011) (defending standard
terms).
102 For a discussion of the ways that boilerplate might achieve a balance
between speaking to courts and speaking to consumers via the theory of modu-
larity, see Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information
Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2006) (“[L]aw and economics, even behavioral
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 22  9-NOV-17 9:54
138 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:117
ordering.103  The vanishingly low cost of boilerplate is essen-
tially dispositive for any cost-benefit analysis—even low-
probability or low-impact benefits are acceptable when they
come very cheap.104  In sum, the traditional economic analysis
of contract sees disclosure requirements as a cheap interven-
tion that supports robust private ordering and prevents ex-
ploitation on the market.
In the following section, I am going to argue that the eco-
nomic model gets it wrong on disclosure.  Not because econo-
mists are overly bullish about the potential for boilerplate to be
helpful—I think at this point most concede that the benefits are
slim.  The problem is that the economic picture of consumer
contracting does not adequately capture the economic and dis-
tributive costs of unread standard terms.
III
PARADOXICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTRACT
In order to make the case that the economic analysis of
terms is ignoring the real costs of disclosures, I am going to
turn to a complementary literature in the social sciences.  A
growing body of experimental evidence speaks directly to the
intuitive normativity of contracts.  That literature makes three
main moves of importance here: it suggests that people take
promises very seriously; that contract is understood as a cate-
gory of promise; and that the contract-as-promise schema is
instantiated even outside of meaningful relationships.
At its best, scholarship from law and psychology asks what
the humans participating in the legal system believe, feel, or
understand about their legal rights and obligations—and then
how those cognitions affect their legal decision-making.  In this
context “legal decision-making” should be understood to en-
compass any decisions in which the legal rule is a non-trivial
factor motivating a particular choice—choosing to commit a
crime or nullify on a jury, of course, but also choosing to cancel
a cable subscription or argue with a customer service represen-
tative over a late fee.
law and economics, does not emphasize the benefits of modularity for human
comprehension and innovation, even though pioneering behavioral economist
Herbert Simon considered the very notion of bounded rationality to imply a strong
trend towards modularity in human problem solving . . . .”).
103 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627,
630–31 (2002) (discussing a market-based justification for form contracts).
104 See Posner, supra note 16, at 1190. R
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So what does the literature on the psychology of legal deci-
sion-making have to say about the costs of boilerplate?  In the
paragraphs that follow, I am going to walk systematically
through a series of research findings that do not obviously
cohere and make the pitch that, taken together, they yield a
surprising picture of disclosure.  The short version is as fol-
lows: 1) Psychological research suggests that individuals have
strong underlying preferences for honoring contracts.105  They
take contracts seriously, and they believe the legal system does
so, too.106  2) Even though they are certainly unable to read
their own consumer contracts, the unreasonable demands of
readership are not cognitively salient.107  3) As such, when con-
sumers are subject to onerous terms in their unread contracts,
many (if not most) individuals identify the non-reading con-
sumer, not the drafter, as the norm-violator, because the con-
sumer has failed to take her contract seriously.108  4) Formal
contracts receive moral and behavioral deference from con-
sumers.109  5) Rules promulgated via boilerplate go unexam-
ined and unchallenged.110  6) The cost to consumers is the
price of adhering to unenforceable, unfavorable terms.111  I am
going to lay out the existing evidence that 1-4 are true, offer a
new set of experiments to demonstrate 5, and discuss 6 as the
logical and problematic implication of all of the above.
A. Contract as Moral Commitment
This Article is largely focused on how non-expert parties
navigate their contractual relationships in the shadow of con-
105 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and
Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 405, 413–20
(2009) (reporting experimental results suggesting that promisors are inclined to
honor contracts, even when an economic incentive to breach the contract exists);
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 652 (2010) (reporting experimental results
showing individuals resist breach of contract even when it is profitable).
106 Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 105, at 417–20 (showing experimen- R
tal evidence suggesting an intuitive connection between informal norms of prom-
ise and informal norms of contract).
107 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1762–68 (describing a study of readabil- R
ity and fault for not reading).
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism in Contract, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 2109, 2123–29 (2015) (reporting the effects of moral norms on unenforce-
able contracts of adhesion when the party has assented via formality, e.g., by
signing).
110 See infra Part IV for experimental evidence of this phenomenon.
111 See infra Part V for discussion of the implications of this framework for
consumers and policymakers.
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tract law.112  Without a court directly telling them what to do,
how do they decide whether to perform, whether to breach, or
whether to sue?  In contract, private legal decision-making is
heavily influenced by the moral and social norms of promissory
exchange.113  I claim, and try to demonstrate empirically, that
the perplexing consequences of standard terms are rooted in
the moral psychology of contract; that the reason that standard
terms are afforded so much deference is because they are con-
tracts, and contracts are promises.
For the last fifty years, sociology and psychology have of-
fered to legal scholarship evidence that contracts are, for the
parties involved, more than neutral financial instruments.  On
the contrary, contracts have social, cultural, and moral mean-
ing.  This meaning is partly derived from the contract’s legal
status, and partly from its close association with the norm of
promise-keeping.114  As to the latter, cultural anthropology has
identified promise-keeping as one of only a very few truly uni-
versal social norms.115  It has a meaning separate from other
norms around gift-giving or reciprocity, meaning specifically
about giving one’s word and then keeping it.
At this point in time, there is substantial, converging evi-
dence, from methodologically diverse research, in support of
the hypothesis that shared informal norms motivate parties to
avoid breach even when the math says they would be better off
breaching.  This is a large and multidisciplinary literature,
which I will try to trace temporally.
In the 1950s and ‘60s, Stewart Macaulay and other col-
leagues working in law and sociology interviewed businessmen
in Wisconsin, to ask them about how they interact with one
another.  The results of that work opened up the scholarly field
112 For an introduction to the idea of the “shadow of the law”—the relationship
between legal rules and private behavior—see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 972 (1979) (positing that private negotiating behavior will be constrained by
the expected value of a court-imposed resolution of a dispute).
113 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 105, at 652 (reporting experimental R
evidence that individuals resist breach of contract even when it is profitable,
because they believe it is morally wrong).
114 See, e.g., Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnership,
74 ECONOMETRICA 1579, 1579 (2006); see also Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannes-
son, Promises, Threats and Fairness, 114 ECON. J. 397, 398–99 (2004) (demon-
strating a “taste” for keeping one’s word); Christoph Vanberg, Why Do People Keep
Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76 ECONOMETRICA
1467, 1467–68 (2008).
115 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins
of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1648–49 (2007) (reporting
cross-cultural norms of promise and exchange).
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of relational contracting—a recognition that for a swath of con-
tracting parties, repeated interactions over time and within
close-knit communities meant that the parties developed
norms of negotiation and dispute resolution outside of the
courtroom.116  Particular attention was paid to the strong norm
of the handshake—the sense that one’s “word” was a bond, and
that it was its own reason not to break an obligation with a
counterparty.117  This research yielded a new perspective on
the reputation costs of breach of contracts in long term rela-
tionships—costs that were both financial insofar as breach
might lead to a breakdown of the business relationship, but
also costs that were more purely personal or social.  This re-
search is, of course, small n, and perhaps of a particular time
and place.  But other researchers have documented similar
phenomena.  Lisa Bernstein, for example, found that
merchants in the small diamond-trading world relied heavily
on informal norms and handshakes in order to enforce
promises.  In effect, the evidence from these sociological stud-
ies is about participants in real world commerce reporting on
their own experiences—they report that their contractual com-
mitments are moral commitments.118
The next wave of research came from experimental and
behavioral economics focusing on intuitions about fairness.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began to document sys-
tematic preferences for fairness, across a range of transactions.
One underappreciated feature of their pathbreaking 1986 arti-
cle “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking” is that it explic-
itly addresses contract fairness.119  The authors considered the
importance of the contractual entitlements (referred to in their
terms as “reference transaction”) in determining fair outcomes.
For example, they asked participants in a survey study
whether it would be fair to reduce wages of a current employee
when unemployment goes up (and thus cheaper employees are
available).  Subjects thought this breach of contract was unfair
116 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56–60 (1963) (describing interviews with business-
men in Wisconsin in the 1960s who largely viewed their contracts as relational
rather than formal).
117 Id. at 58.
118 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 138 (1992) (identifying
both ethical and reputational constraints on transactors in the diamond
industry).
119 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Con-
straint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729
(1986).
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even if it was legally permissible.120  New employees, though,
could fairly be brought on at the lower wage.121  Tversky and
Kahneman found not only that fairness matters, but that a
deal—a contract—changes the way that people think of their
obligations to one another, even without legal enforcement.
Experimental economics has picked up this thread, testing
the role of fairness within real-stakes laboratory games played
in real time by in-person participants.  In experimental eco-
nomics terms, their research question is how much financial
reward people will give up in order to avoid breach.  For exam-
ple, in one experiment, participants were permitted to chat
with one another about whether they planned to cooperate or
defect on a task, where cooperation was better overall but de-
fection was better for the individual.122  When players ex-
changed statements of intention to cooperate, they were no
more likely than anyone else to do so.  But players who decided
to mutually promise were noticeably more likely to actually
cooperate.  In another experiment, players played a “Dictator
Game.”  In a Dictator Game, two players are paired.  One of
them, the Dictator, is given some amount of money, and al-
lowed to share it.  The dependent variable in this setup is mea-
sured by how much the Dictator shares.123  Christoph Vanberg
used a game in which the Dictator could choose either a more
equitable or a more selfish outcome.  Players could chat with
one another before the choice.124  Chatting players who prom-
ised to choose the equitable outcome were significantly more
likely to do so than those who had not promised.  Furthermore,
in some conditions, after talking but before the allocation deci-
sion, the players were switched, separating partners.  Interest-
ingly, once the pair was broken up, the promising Dictators
behaved just like the non-promising Dictators—what mattered
was whether the Dictator had made a promise to this particular
counterparty.125  This scholarship took the logic of contractual
commitments to the laboratory to effectively demonstrate the
plausibility of moral preferences in contract even in the face of
incompatible financial incentives.
120 Id. at 730 (describing vignette study and results).
121 Id.
122 Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 114, at 1580–82. R
123 See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dicta-
tors, and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 210 (1995) (describing the Dictator
Game in experimental economics).
124 Vanberg, supra note 114, at 1470 (explaining methodological choices). R
125 Id. at 1473–76 (showing results of the experimental manipulation).
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Finally, the most recent line of social science research to
pick up on the connection between contract and promise has
come specifically from the law and psychology literature.  In
this literature, the moral implications of contracting have re-
ceived more systematic experimental attention, especially in
the context of breach.126  Scholars including, inter alia, Steven
Shavell, Zev Eigen, Yuval Feldman, David Hoffman, and myself
have asked non-experts to explicitly or implicitly reason
through dilemmas in contract law.  For example, Shavell asked
a group of law students whether it would be immoral to breach
a contract, varying the available information about the parties’
preferences for risk allocation; when they lacked information to
the contrary, his participants viewed breach as immoral.127
Other vignette-study research concludes, in tension with some
descriptions of efficient breach theory,128 that many people
view breach of contract as a moral harm whose social and
psychological costs are not worth the financial rewards.129  Zev
Eigen made the stakes of compliance very high for his subjects,
foisting an extraordinarily long and onerous survey on those
who agreed to take it in return for a DVD.  Subjects could stop
anytime, but many persisted well beyond the point of frustra-
tion; strikingly, this was especially true when they were prod-
ded with rhetoric about the moral stakes of breaching. 130  In
126 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 843, 843–46 (2012) (examining the psychological dimen-
sion of contracts and the role of social norms); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman,
Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 6–9 (2011) (stud-
ying how different characteristics of contractual obligation affect commitment to
comply with contract terms); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Transferring Trust: Reciprocity
Norms and Assignment of Contract, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 511, 511–12 (2012)
(studying how assignment of contract rights affects moral obligation to perform).
127 See generally Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral
Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569–70 (2009)
(acknowledging the widely held belief that breach of contract is immoral, but
arguing that may not always be the case given that contracts are incomplete and
cannot cover every contingency).
128 See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J.
ECON.  466, 471–72 (1980) (showing that expectation damages set incentives for
breach at a level that encourages Pareto-superior transfers).
129 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 105, at 410 (using a series R
of experimental questionnaire studies to show that many people view efficient
breach as an affirmative wrong worthy of supracompensatory damages); see also
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 105, at 659 (reporting that willingness to breach a R
contract required more than trivial financial gains).
130 Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental
Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67,
86–88 (2012) (showing that participants in an onerous online survey were more
likely to continue with the survey when they were reminded that they had agreed
to finish it and were morally obligated to do so).
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other studies, subjects drawn from representative samples re-
port that they would be unwilling to breach a contract for a
small profit, and indicate that only a large premium on breach
would sway them from their promissory commitment.131  Ex-
perimental studies show that willingness to breach is tied ex-
plicitly to the strength of the interpersonal commitment; the
further along a deal gets on the offer-acceptance-performance
continuum, the more reluctant parties are to breach, even
when the costs of breach do not concomitantly increase.132
The upshot of recent experimental research on moral norms of
contract is that there is a non-trivial tendency to treat con-
tracts as promissory obligations and not just currency.  People
place intrinsic value on contract performance, as a moral and
social good.133
B. Salience: The Cognitive Roots of the Moral Psychology
of Contracts
This Article is largely focused on the moral psychology of
breach and performance, but there is also an important piece
of the puzzle from cognitive psychology.  In this context, cogni-
tive psychology asks: How salient, legible, and evaluable are
the attributes of the breach/perform decision?
Two pieces of evidence from the behavioral decision litera-
ture clearly bear on the issues here.  The first is that people
appear rather insensitive to the real-life demands of reader-
ship.  This first came to light by way of an overconfidence
study.134  Overconfidence studies typically ask people to indi-
cate their own level of skill or diligence in a particular domain
(how good a driver, how successful a teacher, etc.).  In one case,
subjects in a brief survey study were randomly assigned to
predict the fraction of boilerplate readership either of them-
131 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 105, at 659. R
132 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract
Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1292 (2015) (finding that some subjects in an
online study reported preferences to perform at the offer stage, and even more at
the acceptance stage, even when it was not binding at acceptance).
133 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Incentives to Breach, 17 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 290, 299 (2015) (showing, for example, that more than half of the players in a
contracts game were unwilling to break their deal for a $12 premium).
134 See, e.g., William C. Howell, Uncertainty from Internal and External
Sources: A Clear Case of Overconfidence, 89 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 240, 242
(1971) (reporting a study showing increased overconfidence particularly over out-
comes determined by the performance of the individual rather than external
factors).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 29  9-NOV-17 9:54
2017] DISCLOSING STANDARD TERMS 145
selves or of other people.135  They guessed their own readership
would be at levels greater than 50% for a credit card contract, a
computer term sheet, and a car warranty—but that others
would read less.136  A belief that others do not read but that I
read suggests a dissonance between the descriptive norm and
the prescriptive norm—sure, people fail to read their contracts,
but they could read them, like I do.  However, in a subsequent
study, participants were randomly assigned to either a) simply
estimate their own level of readership, or b) first estimate the
quantity of fine print they saw in a day and then estimate their
own level of readership.137  Those who had been prompted to
focus on the demands of readership downgraded their esti-
mates of their own readership substantially.138  Subjects over-
all appeared to ignore the context of form contracting—the
impossibility of thorough readership—unless prompted to do
otherwise.
The second finding of interest along these lines comes from
the psychological phenomenon of “norm theory.”139  Norm the-
ory describes a set of results from psychology that deal with
counterfactual thinking.  Counterfactual narratives about an
experience shape judgments and reactions to that experience.
An example might go like this: all else being equal, I am sad if I
do not win a contest that I entered, but probably not as sad if I
didn’t enter the contest at all.  The counterfactual (I might have
won!) is more salient in the former case than in the latter.  In a
previous study, I speculated that this analysis might have
some bite in the context of a party to a contract who failed to
read and later discovered a burdensome term.  The hypothesis
was that the natural counterfactual when a consumer is the
victim of an unread bad term is that same consumer reading
and avoiding the bad term.  This need not be the case—the
counterfactual could be that in the alternate world, the term,
and not the consumer, was different.  This bears directly on
how we assign blame—the more salient actor in the case is
typically assigned blame for choosing the wrong path.140
135 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1774 (showing a table reporting high R
estimates of readership and that estimates were greater for self than the average
consumer).
136 Id. at 1772–74 (explaining study stimuli for each condition).
137 Id. at 1779–81.
138 Id. at 1781 (reporting effect of a prompt about difficulty of reading on
estimates of own likelihood to read).
139 Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its
Alternatives, 93 PSYCH. REV. 136, 136–37 (1986).
140 See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Thinking and
Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL.
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One of the consistent findings of norm theory is that as
between a set of background conditions and an agent in a
narrative, the agent’s alternative choices are more salient than
the alternative background facts.141  In order to leverage this
observation in the consumer contract context, a previous ex-
periment randomly assigned subjects to read about a long-
standing onerous policy in a credit card contract or a new
policy recently implemented by the company.142  In this manip-
ulation, the term is either a background fact with no salient
agent, or the result of an active decision by the firm.  Subjects
who read about the new term rated the unhappy non-reading
consumer as less to blame for his predicament than the con-
sumer who had failed to read the longtime default policy.
Together, these results suggest an availability or a salience
story of non-readership—the possibility or narrative of reading
contracts comes very readily to mind.  It is very easy to imagine
how someone might have avoided a bad term by reading; less
so to imagine how a consumer might have avoided a bad term
by not having an exploitative counterparty.  These studies form
an impression that the reflexive, and perhaps unreflective, lay
view of consumer contracts is that they are readable143—and
perhaps that a manifestation of assent to participate in the
economy is justifiably viewed as an assumption of risk of bad
terms.144
C. Moral Commitment Under Conditions of Dubious
Assent
I have thus far reviewed the empirical evidence that
promises are serious moral obligations for legal actors, and
that contracts, as a species of promise, are also taken seri-
ously.  I have also offered some suggestive evidence that the
unreasonable demands of readership are not especially salient
in the context of making judgments about non-readers.  These
two lines of inquiry converge in a very recent body of research
about how individuals reason about their moral obligations
513, 517 (1986) (showing in an experiment that subjects had greater sympathy in
situations in which the positive alternative was highly salient).
141 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1775–76 (discussing the sali- R
ence of different counterfactuals).
142 Id. at 1777 (explaining methods and results of norm theory experiment).
143 Id. at 1777–78 (experimentally surveying non-experts who systematically
report that they believe people can and should read their contracts).
144 See, e.g., Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social
Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 31 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 293, 299 (2012) (reporting subjects’ own accounts of why they sign
form contracts).
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under conditions of very thin assent.145  The challenge is this:
It is one thing to think that my contract with my cabinetmaker
is regulated by informal interpersonal or moral norms—but
with Comcast?  Or Visa?  Indeed, though, recent research
strongly suggests that the perceived moral obligation of con-
tract is instantiated with formal agreement (e.g., clicking “I
agree” to unread hyperlinked terms) rather than meaningful
assent.146
Three findings along these lines set the stage for the new
experiments reported below.  First, readability does not appear
to affect perceived obligation.  In a recent study, I asked sub-
jects to consider the plight of a consumer who found himself
subject to a fee he did not expect.147  Subjects were randomly
assigned to read that the fee was explained in either a two-page
or a fifteen-page contract.148  They clearly differentiated be-
tween the two conditions when asked whether readership was
a reasonable expectation—they thought it reasonable in the
short contract case and unreasonable in the long contract
case.149  They did not differ, however, in attributions of respon-
sibility; subjects in both conditions viewed the consumer as “to
blame” for his own misfortune.150  That is, even when it was
clear that reading would be much harder in one case than in
the other, the subjects thought that the non-reading consumer
had himself to blame for his problems.
Second, there is evidence that the promissory norms of
contract are “switched on,” so to speak, by formal assent rather
than a more robust meeting of the minds.  In recent experimen-
tal research, subjects were simply asked to assess the moment
of assent.151  When formal assent—something in writing and
signed—was uncoupled from substantive assent—a meeting of
the minds—subjects overwhelmingly chose the moment of for-
145 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 105, at 406–07. R
146 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 132, at 1281–83 (describing R
the importance of signing paperwork); see also Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 109, R
at 2124–26 (showing a higher moral commitment to signed agreements).
147 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1762–68 (describing a study of readabil- R
ity and fault for not reading).
148 Id. at 1763.
149 Id. at 1764 (showing that 34% of subjects thought reading was a reasona-
ble expectation when a contract was fifteen pages long, but 76% thought it was
reasonable when the contract was two pages long).
150 Id. at 1764–65 (“Even though subjects reported that it is unreasonable to
expect a consumer to read a 15-page contract, they nonetheless felt that the non-
reading consumer was as responsible for his non-readership as the consumer
who had only two pages of terms to wade through.”).
151 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 132, at 1283. R
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mal assent as the legally relevant moment.152  Even when sub-
jects were informed that the legal consequences of written and
oral assent were identical, they reported that they would be
less willing to breach a contract that has been formalized in
writing.153  These findings suggest that form contracts have
bite, precisely because of their highly formal structure.
Finally, we have some evidence that terms encapsulated in
formal contract may receive deference even when they are in-
disputably unfair.  In a 1997 experiment by then-graduate stu-
dents Dennis Stolle and Andrew Slain, subjects read vignettes
describing a harm suffered in connection with a contract (e.g.,
a slip-and-fall at a gym).154  Subjects were randomly assigned
to see the contract with or without an exculpatory clause.155
The rather egregious exculpatory clauses included would not
be legally enforceable in most jurisdictions, whether because
they would be void for unconscionability or because they were
barred by statute.156  The authors asked subjects to report
their own reactions—in particular, would they seek compensa-
tion in such a situation, and was the contract unfair—as well
as their beliefs—namely, what would be the likely outcome of a
suit?157  Although the reported results are somewhat scanty,
they are very provocative.  The two most important findings are
as follows:
[C]onsistent with the concerns of many legal scholars, the
presence of exculpatory language did have a deterrent effect
on participants’ propensity to seek compensation.  This main
effect for presence of an exculpatory clause is also consistent
with previous research suggesting that consumers’ contract
schema includes a general belief that written contract terms
are enforceable . . . . Surprisingly, the presence of an excul-
patory clause did not impact participants’ perceptions of the
fairness of the contracts.158
Thus, the Stolle and Slain study offered evidence of one com-
monsense proposition and one puzzling twist.  The common-
152 Id. at 1284–88 (showing survey results in which participants chose the
moment of signing over the moment of in-person verbal assent as the moment of
contract formation).
153 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 109, at 2126–29 (describing empirical results R
from a survey experiment).
154 Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses of Con-
sumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 86–87 (1997).
155 Id. at 87.
156 Id. at 85.
157 Id. at 90–91.
158 Id. at 91.
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sense proposition is that people think they’re bound to
whatever they sign.  The authors suggested that the reason for
this is a misperception of the law—that people believe the law is
more accommodating of burdensome terms than it is.  The puz-
zle is that there were no reported differences in judgments of
fairness.  Contracts that were objectively more burdensome for
consumers were not viewed as less fair.  This is arguably diffi-
cult to explain based on perceptions of law alone; individuals
can and do distinguish between legality and fairness.
In sum, there is a growing body of evidence that people not
only believe that contracts are enforceable, they often believe
that contractual obligations are also moral obligations.  Fur-
ther, the perceptions of legal and moral bindingness are sur-
prisingly insensitive to the form and possibly even the content
of the contract.  There is evidence for a sort of on-off switch.159
On an intuitive account of contracts of adhesion, any docu-
mented manifestation of assent triggers all (or many, or most)
of the moral and legal implications of contract and promise.160
This commitment to contractual sanctity puts people in a
bind, because they cannot possibly treat each form with atten-
tion and deliberation.  The remainder of this Article explores
the natural logical extension of the existing literature: that the
moral commitment to contracting might redound to the disad-
vantage of the non-drafting parties because there is a mis-
match when contracts cannot be taken seriously ex ante but
courts and parties purport to find meaningful assent ex post.




The overarching goal of this Article is to connect the prac-
tice of disclosure to the moral psychology of contract—to ask
how the provision of notice and the exchange of forms affect
individual parties, irrespective of the legal status of the terms.
In order to assess the effect of terms on perceptions of
contractual obligations, I used an experimental vignette
study.161  I showed participants brief descriptions of contracts,
randomly assigning subjects to three assent conditions.  Spe-
159 See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1747–50 (arguing empirically for a R
connection between formal agreement and moral commitment).
160 See id. at 1757.
161 See generally Christiane Atzmuller & Peter M. Steiner, Experimental
Vignette Studies in Survey Research, 6 METHODOLOGY 128 (2010) (describing and
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cifically, the independent variable was the accessibility of a
particular burdensome term—was it provided up front, or of-
fered after purchase, or only available by affirmative search?
Subjects were asked in each case to evaluate the term’s legal
and moral effect, respectively, including their inclination to
challenge the policy.  The prediction was that a policy embodied
in contractual terms that were made available before assent
would be taken more seriously than terms only available after
purchase, and that in turn those “rolling contract” terms would
be taken more seriously than policies made available outside of
contract.
A. Study Design
Subjects were recruited to participate in experimental
studies at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of
Business.  A separate pool of subjects was also recruited to
participate via Amazon Mechanical Turk.162  The two samples
behaved very similarly, and only the Wharton results are re-
ported in full in the body of this paper.  Results from the
Mechanical Turk replication are provided in the Appendix.
All subjects read two short vignettes describing surprising
and unfavorable contract terms, with each study experimen-
tally manipulating different features of the vignette.  Subjects
were asked to answer a series of follow-up questions after each
scenario.
The vignettes were designed to cover some of the most im-
portant ground by invoking both a defensive and an offensive
consumer stance.  They are not designed to be compared to one
evaluating methods for drawing inferences to responses from random assignment
to different scenarios).
162 Amazon Mechanical Turk is an online platform from which individual
workers/participants can be recruited to do small tasks for small sums of money;
it is an increasingly common online forum for soliciting participants to engage in
research studies.  It has been studied extensively at this point.  Its advantages are
that populations recruited via Turk are more representative of the national popu-
lation than convenience samples (e.g., undergraduates) and that a variety of ex-
perimental findings have been replicated using Mechanical Turk. See, e.g., Adam
J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets
for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POLITICAL ANALYSIS
351 (2012).  There is also evidence, both systematic and anecdotal, that Turk
subjects are particularly attentive, perhaps due to the formal mechanisms availa-
ble for receiving feedback that affects reputation ratings.  The disadvantage of
Mechanical Turk as compared to the sample procured by a commercial survey
firm is the young and leftward skew of the population.  Turk respondents are
“wealthier, younger, more educated, less racially diverse, and more Democratic”
than national samples.  Andrew R. Lewis et al., The (Non) Religion of Mechanical
Turk Workers, 54 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 419, 419–20 (2015).
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another, only to be compared within-scenario, across condi-
tions.  In the Fee scenario, the customer is surprised to find
himself being charged a fee by a car rental agency.  In the
Waiver scenario, the individual is surprised to find himself un-
able to get money from the hotel for damage to personal prop-
erty.  In familiar behavioral decision-making paradigms, one
cost is framed in loss terms (the fee) and the other in gain terms
(foregone compensation).163  Although the two scenarios obvi-
ously do not exhaust the possible ways in which a consumer
might be affronted by a company policy, there are reasons to
think that most people distinguish between these two kinds of
costly terms.  Therefore I use both to assess the possibility that
the distinction between contract and not-contract exists across
terms that burden the consumer as well as terms that relieve
the burden of the drafter.
Each case was designed to invoke the idea of a company
policy with reasonably salient stakes.  This is distinguished, at
this point at least, from arbitration clauses and class action
waivers, which may be problematic on other normative
grounds, but are too remote from everyday experience to get
traction in a scenario study.164  The company policies in ques-
tion are meant to push the boundaries of reasonable business
practices.  The goal is that readers view the policies as burden-
some and problematic, such that they would be inclined, all
else being equal, to object.  The stakes are mid-range—not
enormous transactions like home-buying where readership ar-
guably has a clearer normative status, but not the EULA for a
movie download, either.  The goal was to invoke run-of-the-
mill, in-person, consumer contracting scenarios, where the
manifestation of assent is evinced by signature, in the presence
of the drafter’s agent, in a situation in which careful readership
is possible but would be unusual.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions
for each vignette.  The independent variable was, roughly, the
quality of the notice of terms: standard form, rolling contract,
and online policy.  The three conditions were drafted to be as
similar as possible on all dimensions except the consumer’s
access to the company policy.  Thus the term in all three condi-
tions was described as having been available and documented
163 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2003) (explaining different behavior under “gain
frames” than under “loss frames”).
164 See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler supra note 89, at 114–16 (showing that reading R
an arbitration clause does not deter purchase).
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prior to the customer complaint.  In each condition, subjects
were meant to have the sense that the company had a real,
long-standing policy.  In this way, each policy was intended to
feel like a true company practice rather than an ad hoc penalty,
in each case verifiable with documentation in a way that paral-
lels the standard contract condition.
The dependent variables homed in on a few main con-
structs.  The rationale for the response variables of central in-
terest are described briefly here; the exact wording is given in
the Methods subsection below.
• Enforceability: The study asked subjects to give their
best guess about the legal effect of the contract.  This is
the first question after they read the vignette and argua-
bly the most important, insofar as the perceived legal
status of a term affects its moral weight as well as the
likelihood of challenge.
• Assent: In order to assess subjective views of assent,
each condition was evaluated for subjects’ own under-
standings of the level of meaningful agreement.
• Individual and Company Responsibility for Unread
Terms: In two questions, subjects indicated the extent
to which the consumer and the company, respectively,
were at “fault” for the consumer’s ignorance of the term.
One speculation is that the apportionment of blame af-
fects how and when people seek redress.
• Fairness: This inquiry builds on the moral psychology
literature showing strong commitments to contracts.
As in the breach literature, we would expect to find that
increased perceptions of fairness are associated with
increased compliance to the terms of the contract, irre-
spective of legal mechanisms for challenge or exit.
• Reasonableness of Means of Communicating Terms:
Subjects were asked to indicate the extent to which it is
reasonable to expect knowledge of a particular policy.
This acts in part as a manipulation check when the
experimental manipulation is precisely aimed at ease of
reading, but also helps give a baseline sense of how
consumers view the norms of consumer readership.
• Legal Status Uncertain: The last two questions, posed
on a separate second page, asked subjects to assume
that the legal status of the policy is unclear, and then to
consider the probability of suit and the normative sta-
tus of the policy.  This was meant to separate the as-
sumptions or beliefs about enforceability from
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willingness to challenge—so, does the standard con-
tract elicit weaker preferences to challenge, even if it is
clear that a challenge may be successful?  These last
two questions were raised after the rest, on a separate
page, so that the introduction of legal uncertainty would
not affect how subjects answered the question about
legal enforceability.
B. Method
A contract term may be problematic because it is exces-
sively burdensome to consumers, or because it is difficult for
consumers to discover, understand, or evaluate before the deal
becomes binding.  This study tested the basic hypothesis that
more transparent contracting practices predict perceptions of
increased legal and moral obligation, decreased likelihood to
challenge, and more positive views of the drafter.
208 participants were recruited via the Wharton Behav-
ioral Lab (WBL) at the University of Pennsylvania.165 72.1% of
subjects were female.  Subject ages ranged from 18 to 41 with a
median age of 20.  Subjects were 13.4% first-year students,
28.3% second-year students, 21.6% third-year students, and
36.5% fourth-year students.  They came from the College
(61.1%), the School of Engineering (8.7%), the school of Nurs-
ing (3.4%) and the Wharton School (26.4%).  They were paid an
average of $11 for participation in a total of three consecutive
unrelated studies taken during a one-hour time slot, of which
this was the second.
The questionnaire was programmed in Qualtrics and took
under ten minutes to complete.  Subjects were assigned to indi-
vidual carrels with desktop computers.  They could not see the
screens of other participants, and no identifying information
was collected; responses were confidential and anonymous.
In total each subject saw two vignettes, in random order,
and with each vignette randomly appearing in one of the three
conditions.  The two scenarios are detailed below.
The Waiver scenario read as follows:
Jamie recently rented a hotel room with Home Again Suites
for a night, so he could go to his cousin’s out of town wed-
165 The Wharton Behavioral Laboratory is a fully staffed, full-time research
facility at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business.  The WBL
recruits subjects on and off campus for experimental research.  Subjects sign up
for one-hour slots for which they are paid $10–$15 in total.  Subjects who partici-
pated in this study also participated in two other, unrelated studies during the
course of the hour.
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ding.  The hotel room cost about $100 for a night.  Just as
Jamie was getting ready for bed, the fire alarm went off.  He
grabbed his wallet and overnight bag and went outside to
wait with the other guests.  The manager came out and apol-
ogized, explaining that a small kitchen fire had started and
been extinguished, and everyone could return to their rooms
within a half hour.  The manager warned everyone that the
bathroom sprinklers had been briefly activated on the ground
floor, and to be careful of slippery floors.  He announced that
all guests would have their room charges refunded.
Jamie was immediately concerned, because he had left his
laptop charging next to the bathroom sink where there was
an easily accessible outlet.  When he returned to his room, he
found his laptop in a shallow puddle, and it would not turn
on.  His laptop was relatively new and had cost over $1000.
He went to see the hotel’s manager at the front desk, who
apologized but said, “I am really sorry, but our policy is not to
cover any unintentional damage to guests’ personal
property.”




The manager pulled out the agreement Jamie 
signed when he checked in and showed him a 
clause on the second page.  Jamie’s signature was 
at the bottom of the page. 
Rolling 
Contract 
The manager pulled out the agreement Jamie 
signed when he checked in and showed him a 
clause on the second page.  It read, “This 
agreement includes and incorporates the policies 
listed in the Guest Binder available with the 
manager.”  Jamie’s signature was at the bottom of 
the page.  The manager showed Jamie the part of 
the Guest Binder with Guest Policies. 
Online 
Policy 
The manager pulled out a three-ring binder with 
the cover label, “Guest Binder” and turned to the 
tab for “Home Again Suites Guest Policies.”  A copy 
of the Guest Binder is in every room. 
[The clause read], “Home Again Suites shall not be liable for
any damage to personal property including damage caused
by the negligence or recklessness of Home Again Suites em-
ployees, affiliates, or guests.”
Subjects rated their agreement with 7 statements, each on
a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 was “totally disagree” and 7 was
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“totally agree.”  Each question is listed here with a variable
name for ease of reporting results below; subjects did not see
variable labels.
TABLE B
Legal Jamie is not legally entitled to compensation 
for the laptop damage. 
Fair This is a fair contract.
Customer Fault It is Jamie’s fault that he didn’t know about 
the liability waiver. 
Hotel Fault It is the hotel’s fault that Jamie didn’t know 
about the liability waiver. 
Assent Jamie agreed to the policy.
Moral Jamie is morally obligated to follow the 
hotel’s policy in this case. 
Communication Home Again Suites uses a reasonable way to 
communicate its policies to its customers. 
Subjects then clicked through to a second set of two follow-
up questions, preceded by the new assumption that the law’s
legal status is uncertain:
Assume that when a lawyer friend of Jamie’s looks at the
state’s contract laws, she finds that the law is not clear on
whether or not this kind of term in this situation is enforcea-
ble.  In the event that the state law is unclear:
TABLE C
Sue If I were Jamie, I would sue the hotel for the value 
of the laptop ($1,000) in small claims court. 
Legitimate Home Again Suites’s policy is a legitimate business 
practice in this context, and the law should permit 
it. 
The Fee scenario described a customer faced with a fee (a
loss rather than a foregone gain as in the hotel scenario).  In
this scenario the Rolling Contract condition does not include
an affirmative agreement to be bound by additional terms to
follow:
Jake recently made a phone reservation for a rental car from
Autoday, a national car rental agency.  He picked up the car
on a Tuesday at a local branch of Autoday, where there was a
long line of customers waiting to get their cars.  When he got
to the rental desk, an Autoday agent gave him a short rental
agreement, which he was asked to sign.  He signed, paid, and
received the car keys and a “Welcome to Autoday” folder.
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Jake drove the car for almost a week.  During the week, he
had a number of meetings, and as a result received two park-
ing tickets when he was late to fill his meter.  His tickets were
$32 each, and he sent a check for $64 to the city’s parking
authority right away.  He returned his rental car at the end of
the week.
One week later, he looked at his credit card bill and saw a
new charge for $200 from the car rental agency.  Confused,
he called the company.  They told him that they charged a
$100 processing fee for each parking ticket issued against




The customer service agent told him that the fee 
was spelled out in the rental agreement Jake 
signed at the reservation desk, and the agent 
emailed him a scan of the relevant page, showing 
the clause and Jake’s signature at the bottom. 
Rolling 
Contract 
The customer service agent told him that the fee 
was spelled out in a terms and conditions 
document in his “Welcome to Autoday” folder.  The 
agent emailed him a scan of the relevant page.  
Posted 
Policy 
The customer service agent told him that the fee 
was spelled out on the company’s website.  The 
agent emailed him a link to the relevant page. 
It read, “Parking tickets issued to this vehicle result in a $100
processing fee per ticket, to be charged automatically to the
customer.”  Jake did not expect this policy and did not want
to pay the fee.
C. Results
Tables 1 and 2 show the mean response on a 1-7 scale for
each response variable.  These tables show every mean for
every condition in both vignettes.  Of the 16 response variables
(8 for each scenario), only one variable differed significantly
between the Standard and the Rolling contract, namely the
Enforceable item in the Fee scenario.
The tables show three separate comparisons, with statisti-
cal significance, per variable.  For each item, I compared the
Standard Contract to the Online Policy, and I compared the
Rolling Contract to the Online Policy—that is, each Contract
condition was separately compared to the Policy condition.  The
statistical tests of difference are reported by asterisk on the
Contract variable.
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Because the Standard and Rolling conditions behaved so
similarly, I also joined them together for the purposes of a less
granular analysis, comparing an overall Contract condition
with a Policy condition.  The table shows the means for each
variable by condition.  This is reported in the fourth column
with a yes/no value.  All reported significance tests reported in
tables below compare conditions with a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test.166  Narrative analysis of these results is reported below
the tables.
TABLE 1.
HOTEL LIABILITY WAIVER SCENARIO: MEAN RESPONSES FOR





Policy Contract  
vs. Policy:  
Significant  
Difference 
Enforceable 4.8 4.9 4.7 No
Fair 3.4 3.4 3.1 No
Customer Fault 3.9** 3.8* 3.1 Yes 
Company Fault 4.1** 4.4* 4.8 Yes 
Consent 5.4*** 5.3** 4.4 Yes 
Moral 3.7 4 3.7 No 
Communication 3*** 2.8** 2.2 Yes 
Sue 5 5 5.3 No
Policy Legitimate 3.5+ 3.7* 3.1 Yes 
166 A Wilcoxon rank-sum test is a test of significance used for comparisons of
two samples, as with the more familiar t-test.  Rather than a comparison of
means, it is a comparison of medians.  The Wilcoxon rank-sum test essentially
asks whether the observations in one condition tend to be greater than the obser-
vations in the other.  This is generally a conservative measure of statistical
significance.
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TABLE 2.
CAR RENTAL FEE SCENARIO: MEAN RESPONSES FOR EACH





Policy Contract  
vs. Policy:  
Significant  
Difference 
Enforceable 5.9** 5.5 5.2 Yes 
Fair 4.2* 3.8 3.6 No
Customer Fault 5** 4.6+ 4.1 Yes 
Company Fault 4.2 4.3 4.8 Yes 
Consent 5.6 5.3 4.6 Yes 
Moral 4.6** 4.3* 4.3 No
Communication 3.3* 3 2.7 Yes 
Sue 3.6* 3.7+ 4.2 Yes 
Policy Legitimate 4.2** 3.8 3.4 Yes 
p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; *** p <.001. Significance tests show p-values for 
Wilcoxon rank-sum comparisons of each variable in the Standard Contract and
Rolling Contract conditions, respectively, with the Policy Condition.   
1. Short Contract vs. Rolling Contract
As Tables 1 and 2 show, there were few statistically signifi-
cant differences between the Short Contract and the Rolling
Contract.  Some trends suggest a slightly more skeptical atti-
tude toward the Rolling Contract, and some of these differences
would likely come to light in a study with more power.  None-
theless, the most striking result here was how similarly sub-
jects treated terms that would clearly be enforceable on
traditional assent analyses and those that would be suspect for
lack of notice.  Figure 1 shows the percentage of subjects who
agreed with each statement (i.e., chose 5-7 on the 7-point scale
of agreement), by condition.
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FIGURE 1.
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS AGREEING WITH EACH STATEMENT,
BY CONDITION, FEE SCENARIO
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FIGURE 2.
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS AGREEING WITH EACH STATEMENT,
BY CONDITION, WAIVER SCENARIO




































Figure 1 shows that subjects appeared to believe that the
terms available in a non-contractual document, presented only
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after the contract had been signed, were viewed as similar to a
standard form contract in terms of enforceability, assent, legiti-
macy, and subject to challenge.  One is always hesitant to re-
port a null result as real evidence, especially in a scenario
study, so I offer my conclusions cautiously.  Although subjects
may distinguish the Simple and Rolling contracts along dimen-
sions other than those prompted, they did not do so, or at least
not consistently, in response to these questions—even the
questions about communicative efficacy that were meant more
or less as manipulation checks. 167  The statement about the
contract being a “reasonable way to communicate” was in-
tended to draw out the intuition that a single dose of standard
boilerplate is easier to skim than multiple iterations of stan-
dard boilerplate.  It did not.  One reasonable inference would be
that subjects find both kinds of contracting to be equally rea-
sonable ways of communicating information to consumers.  My
own intuition is actually in accord with this view, though I
would go further and argue that the three contract procedures
under consideration are equally ineffective as communication.
In this case, though, I think that most subjects saw the stan-
dard and rolling contracts as just more or less within the
boundaries of contract.  A short separate study is in line with
this interpretation.168  Nonetheless, the null result was sur-
prising, and I offer some further thoughts in the Discussion.
167 A manipulation check in a psychology experiment is a direct question
about the subject’s experience of the independent variable of interest, to make
sure that the experimental manipulation itself succeeded qua independent varia-
ble.  So if the study were on the effect of emotion on test performance, with
subjects being randomly induced to feel happiness or sadness, a manipulation
check would just ask, usually at the end of the experiment session, “How do you
feel?”  If subjects did not differ on this dimension, it might give the experimenters
pause about the effectiveness of their emotion-inducement mechanism.  In this
case, the finding that subjects did not view the standard and rolling contracts as
dissimilar in communicative efficacy essentially becomes its own result insofar as
there is no evidence that subjects failed to comprehend the scenarios.
168 From a separate study, I have some evidence that when prompted to con-
sider contracts procedures with salient reference points, people do distinguish
between standard and rolling contracts.  286 Turk subjects answered the follow-
ing short questionnaire:
Acme Gym gives its members a three-page membership contract
when they sign up. It includes all of the company’s policies and
procedures.
Fitness Works gives its members a three-page membership contract
when they sign up.  It includes most of the company’s policies and
procedures.  During the first month of membership, they also send
their members a Welcome Packet, which includes additional terms
and conditions of membership.
Please rate each company’s Contracting Policies below, where the worst policies
for customers are rated 0 and the best are rated 100.
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2. Contracts vs. Policies
The main result of this study is the difference between the
contracts on the one hand (standard or rolling) and the policy
on the other.  Though some comparative differences are less
robust, overall, subjects differentiated significantly between
the Contract conditions and the Policy condition.  They viewed
a policy embedded in an unread contract as more likely to be
enforceable in court and were favorable toward the company.
When asked to assume that the policy was on uncertain legal
grounds, they nonetheless reported less willingness to pursue
a claim in court when the policy was included in the contract,
and more support for the policy as a legitimate business prac-
tice.  Tables 1 and 2 show the means for each question in each
condition.  Figures 1 and 2 describe the data in different terms,
showing the distribution of responses rather than the means.
This may provide some more meaningful way of thinking about
what these results mean.
To take the results reported in Figure 1: Moving a policy
out of the rolling contract and onto the website led 10% fewer
subjects to believe that the term was enforceable, 23% fewer
subjects to believe that the consumer had assented, and 19%
fewer subjects to view the policy as a legitimate business prac-
tice.  The results reported in Figure 2 are visibly messier but all
told convey a similar story—distinct and robust shifts in as-
signment of blame and inferences of assent.
3. Replication in a Non-Student Sample
As noted in the introduction to the Methods section, this
study was replicated fully on Amazon Turk.  Those results,
included in the Appendix, yield one main impression, namely
that the results look even more dramatic than in the student
population.  This subject pool included more male subjects,
more subjects of different socioeconomic backgrounds, and a
much greater age range.  Subjects consistently viewed the non-
contractual policies as less fair, less enforceable, and less legit-
imate than the contractual policies, even when the contract in
question was dubious at best.  This is a finding to keep in mind
going forward, as there are reasons to think that the general
sample both has more experience in diverse contracts and that
When asked to compare the two contracting methods side-by-side, subjects
graded the pre-acceptance contract as an 80.6 and the post-acceptance docu-
ment as a 52.7.  This mean difference of 27.9 points on a hundred-point scale is
highly significant on a within-subjects t-test (t=12.50, df=285, p=.000).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 46  9-NOV-17 9:54
162 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:117
it is a sample less likely to have in-depth knowledge of the legal
system and the law of contracts.
Overall, across samples, these results show some substan-
tial shifts in subjects’ intuitions and judgments across the
term-policy divide.  Terms in contract form were taken more
seriously as legal and moral obligations than terms in more
clearly non-contractual form.
D. Follow-up Study: Testing Assumptions About Contract
Law
In a short follow-up study, I tested the hypothesis that
individuals make assumptions about the legal approach to
contract enforcement, and that those assumptions affect their
approach to fine print, either by providing a convincing norma-
tive argument or just by raising the previously-unconsidered
possibility that there is something legally objectionable about
assent to consumer contracts.
140 subjects recruited via Amazon Turk were paid $0.50
each to complete a three-minute questionnaire.
All subjects read the Fee scenario in the Rolling Contract
condition described above.  They were then told that the pro-
tagonist, Jeremy, decided to sue the car rental company in
small claims court.  They then read something about the out-
come of the case, randomly assigned among the three following
conditions.
TABLE E
Control The judge heard the case and made his ruling. 
Enforceable “In this case, the fee is permissible,” said the 
judge.  “The fee is upheld on the basis of the 
customer’s consent.  The customer agreed to 
the terms and conditions of rental including the 
Additional Policies document.”  Jeremy lost the 
case and paid the fee. 
Unenforceable “In this case, the fee is impermissible,” said the 
judge.  “The fee is void for lack of consent.  The 
customer did not agree to the terms and 
conditions of rental included in the Additional 
Policies document.”  Jeremy won the case and 
did not pay the fee. 
Subjects were asked to indicate their agreement, on a scale
from 1 to 7, with the following statements.
1. Jeremy sounds like someone I would like.
2. The car rental company is in the wrong here.
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3. Jeremy is to blame for this situation.
4. The right decision for the judge to make is to enforce
the fee and require Jeremy to pay.
FIGURE 3.




























No Decision Term Enforceable Term Unenforceable
Subjects who were not told what the judge would find be-
lieved the contract would be enforceable with almost precisely
the same confidence as subjects who read that the judge would
enforce the term.  Subjects given the information that a judge
refused to enforce the term appeared to update their beliefs and
judgments such that they believed that the term should not be
enforceable and that the company was to blame.  Overall, the
Enforceable condition was statistically indistinguishable from
the Control condition.  The Unenforceable condition, on the
other hand, was dramatically different from the Control.  Sub-
jects who read that the contract was void for lack of consent
reported that the consumer was less to blame (mean differ-
ence=1.9, W=934.5, p=.000), the company was more to blame
(mean difference=1.8, W=1621, p=.000), the decision to enforce
was more robust (mean difference=2.0, W=465.4, p=.000), and
the customer was more likeable (mean difference =.9, W=723.5,
p=.007).
These results suggest that subjects essentially intuited the
Enforceable scenario.  Their own view was that the term was
probably enforceable.  When informed that a judge ruled the
contract term void for lack of consent, however, their views
shifted markedly.  They switched the burden of blame from the
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consumer to the company, and moved judgments of enforce-
ability across the midline.
This study raises some important questions about the role
of law in contract intuitions.  They suggest that people have a
particular view of the legal norms in this area—namely, if it’s in
a contract, it’s enforceable—and that the possibility of a legal
norm that requires more meaningful assent acts as an update.
V
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
To summarize the results: subjects believed policies em-
bedded in a contract were more likely to be legally enforceable,
judged those policies as more fair, and imagined that they
would be less likely to challenge those policies in court.  The
possibility that the legal rule might take fairness or meaningful
assent into account appeared to be new information.
Until now, the mismatch between consumer contracting
and contract doctrine has been couched in terms of disclosure
overload,169 an apt characterization of the current consumer
landscape, but a red herring.  The problem is not that people
are failing their duty to read their contracts because of
bounded rationality.  The problem is that the terms, afforded so
little attention ex ante, have too much weight ex post.  The duty
to read doctrine has formal legal consequences for parties, of
course, but research on informal norms might suggest that the
doctrine also has consequences for the colloquial understand-
ing of contracting as a social practice.170  When terms are me-
morialized and documents shared, they assume the mantle of
contract-capital-C, with all of its moral and social baggage.171
Policies or rules promulgated in the form of a contract, whether
or not that contract is read or is intended to be read, look and
feel legitimate.  People feel more bound, legally and morally, by
policies that they agreed to, in the thinnest sense, even if the
policies are clearly burdensome or problematic or otherwise
169 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10, at 687 (discussing the R
problem of disclosure overload).
170 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—
Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L.
REV.  1051, 1058 (1965) (“The duty to read in a fairly strict form carries out the
substantive goal . . . On the basis of common sense but not much evidence, some
have assumed that this tack will promote self-reliance.  If one knows he will be
legally bound to what he signs, he will take care to protect himself (or so it is said).
And this would be a good thing.”).
171 See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 109, at 2126 (arguing that formalization is R
viewed as an important trigger for moral obligation in contract).
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unfair.172  In turn, a policy’s inclusion in a form contract may
reduce the likelihood that consumers will challenge a practice
using market power, informal dispute mechanisms, the court
system, or the political process.
A. Incentives to Produce Boilerplate
The final section of this paper argues that if the experimen-
tal results described here are correctly identifying a cultural
phenomenon, they should disrupt existing analyses of con-
tract, because they reshape our sense of the relationship be-
tween disclosure and fairness.  On most existing accounts,
disclosure makes contracts more fair.  These studies raise the
question of whether the opposite might be true.  This is a
deeply disruptive intervention, because current legal and policy
approaches to contract try to get to fairness via disclosure.  The
focus on disclosure is obfuscating, though; it clouds both the
legal and the cultural discourse around fairness in consumer
contracting.  The focus on procedural fairness via disclosure, to
the exclusion of substantive fairness, creates affirmative incen-
tives for firms to keep disclosing.  If disclosure is bad for con-
sumers, we are incentivizing the wrong thing.  The next two
subsections address these incentives—the positive incentives
to drafters to keep producing boilerplate, and the absence of
disincentives for including borderline or unenforceable terms.
1. Substantial Benefits to Drafters of Unread Terms
Firms understand that their terms will be policed via the
assent doctrine, not as a matter of the balance of equities be-
tween the parties.  Mostly for the better, courts do not actually
look into an exchange and evaluate the equities.  People are
free to agree to inequitable exchanges most of the time, so long
as they have assented.  Fairness via assent is the background
explanation for the rule of expectation damages, as well as the
limitation on damages to only those losses that were reasona-
bly foreseen173: parties can be held liable for the liability to
which they have manifested assent, and only that liability.174
In fact, even contract doctrines that purport to treat fairness on
its own terms revert to an assent inquiry.  The test of good faith
172 See Stolle & Slain, supra note 154, at 90–92; infra Part III. R
173 See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 633–37 (1988); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 12.8 (1990).
174 See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 173  (explaining how damages are R
often limited to an objective evaluation of the injured party’s expectations).
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and fair dealing, for example, is a constraint on how the parties
may interpret their obligations to one another, and it requires
that they deal “fairly.”175  The test of good faith and fair dealing
prohibits parties from taking advantage or exploiting—but how
do we know when one party’s behavior is reasonable and when
it is exploitation?  Courts look to the parties’ own understand-
ings at the time of assent; the question of whether or not it
would be fair to fire an at-will employee just after she lands a
big account is a question of the nature of the deal the court
thinks the parties understood themselves to have assented to
ex ante.176  The upshot of this stance is that firms that wish to
promulgate one-sided or burdensome terms have every incen-
tive to disclose those terms—in bold print, in all-caps, etc.—
within their standard contract.
It is very, very difficult to escape this incentive structure,
even when there is widespread agreement that courts should
police unfair terms on substance.  I will briefly describe a case
in point—a sort of exception that proves the rule: the ALI pro-
ject on a proposed Restatement on Consumer Contract.177  Its
core approach is a loosening of assent doctrine coupled with
heightened policing of unfairness:
[T]he “grand bargain” that the common law of consumer con-
tracts reflects allows for relatively easy adoption of the stan-
dard contract terms that businesses draft, balanced by a set
of substantive boundary restrictions that prohibit businesses
from going too far . . . as assent rules shift to the more
permissive end of the continuum, courts have perceived
greater need and justification for mandatory restrictions and
ex post scrutiny of abusive terms.178
This proposal is of particular interest for this Article be-
cause it is dealing with the problem of non-readership head-on,
and taking seriously the possibility of scrutinizing terms for
unfairness.  The reason that I call this proposal an exception
that proves the rule is that even as it recommends a shift in
175 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.”); id. at cmt. d. (providing examples of bad faith
performance); see also Robert Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818–21 (1982).
176 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977) (“[I]n
every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract.”) (quoting Uproar Co. v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co.,
81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1936)).
177 RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS, supra note 92. R
178 RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS, supra note 92, at 26. R
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focus from assent to substantive fairness, it nonetheless re-
tains enough traditional assent doctrine that it locks in the
one-way ratchet for the production of standard terms.
Take, for example, the following illustration.  The proposed
rule for notice, made considerably more lenient than the usual
rules of assent in contract, includes the following model case:
Illustration 18.  A consumer visits a store to purchase a good.
Upon payment at the cash register, the consumer is handed a
sales receipt referencing additional terms and noting that
these additional terms can be obtained at the customer-ser-
vice desk.  The additional terms are adopted as part of the
contract.
Illustration 18 is arguably expanding the current under-
standing of assent to include a term that a reasonably prudent
offeree would not discover.  Although we might be justified in
thinking that most people would not think a receipt has con-
tract terms on the back of it, there are persuasive policy argu-
ments for loosening assent in this way in the consumer
context.  But here is its counterexample:
Illustration 19.  Same as [above] but now the sales receipt
does not include a reference to the additional terms.  The
additional terms are not adopted as part of the contract. . . .
The result in Illustration 19 essentially doubles down on
the legal fiction, in the sense that the reasoning suggests not
only that the courts take readership seriously, but that they
take it so seriously that they think that there is a meaningful
difference between notice of terms on the back of a receipt and
no explicit notice of terms.
The important thing to notice here is that the new Restate-
ment approach intends to deal explicitly with non-readership,
and to do so via strengthened doctrines of fraud and uncon-
scionability.  But its relaxation of the assent standard has the
perverse effect of encouraging firms to produce even more fine
print.  If company policies must be flagged on the back of the
receipt in order to receive deference from courts, then firms
should use every opportunity to indicate to consumers that
they are committed to unread terms—even though it will not
change anything about consumer choice ex ante.
Current models encourage production of useless terms,
and policies that continue in this vein are misguided and even
harmful.  Courts and policymakers might start to think about
what regulation would look like if one goal were to disincen-
tivize boilerplate.  If contracts without terms are actually more
fair than contracts with full disclosure, then we ought to at
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least entertain the idea that we should be discouraging rather
than incentivizing disclosures.  We might indulge in the follow-
ing thought experiment: What would it look like to have con-
tracts but no disclosure of standard terms?  In a world without
terms, people buy products and click “Buy” rather than “I
agree.”179  There are no hyperlinks to terms and conditions.  No
EULAs pop up when users download software.180  A rental car
company gives its customer a receipt and the keys to the car,
but no paperwork.181  Readers subscribe to magazines not
knowing if renewal is automatic;182 exercisers join gyms not
knowing if they can recover damages for personal injuries;183
car buyers purchase warranties without knowing whether they
are covered for losses from vandalism;184 online shoppers buy
shoes or prescription drugs or electronics without knowing
whether vendors plan to share their purchasing patterns with
other sellers.185
Termlessness is not quite as disruptive a notion as it looks
at first glance.  Notice is deeply material to assent to a negoti-
ated deal, but none of the convincing justifications for assent to
standard terms actually requires that terms be provided to the
179 See, e.g., Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 475 n.3 (2002) (reviewing a series of
cases in which courts upheld assent to terms via an “I Agree” button but refused
in some cases where the assent manifestation was less explicit).
180 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly
Mass Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 687, 688 (2004)
(“Despite all the scholarly debate, one important reality remains: EULAs are here
to stay for the foreseeable future. Courts, by and large, have enforced
EULAs . . . .”).
181 See e.g., Andreas Fink & Torsten Reiners, Modeling and Solving the Short-
Term Car Rental Logistics Problem, 42 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E: LOGISTICS
AND TRANSPORTATION REV. 272, 275 (2006) (“A rental starts with a check-out at
some station where the customer signs the contract and ends with a check-in at
the same or a different station where the car is returned.”).
182 See, e.g., Mark Stiving, Sleazy Pricing by WSJ, PRAGMATIC PRICING (Dec. 23,
2012), http://pragmaticpricing.com/2012/12/23/sleazy-pricing-by-wsj/
[https://perma.cc/8M7F-8BHL] (“Wow, I didn’t even notice.  That was my fault.  It
was my responsibility to read whatever fine print there was when I originally
signed up saying the rate would go up 3 fold after the first year.”).
183 See, e.g., Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, 132 A.3d 746, 747–48 (Del. 2016) (permit-
ting release of liability for major injuries enforceable under Delaware law).
184 See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (2011) (explaining the surprising absence of any
mechanisms by which “informed and vigilant consumers are currently unable to
comparison shop among carriers on the basis of differences in coverage.”).
185 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Understanding Privacy Policies: Con-
tent, Self-Regulation, and Markets 1 (NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organi-
zation, Working Paper No. 16–18, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2736513 [https://perma.cc/78D8-J6BD] (describing the variety
of privacy policies and their uneven responses to FTC regulation).
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parties as part of the transaction.186  Whether parties are
deemed to be consenting to reasonable terms only,187 or con-
senting to be surprised,188 or letting the most discerning con-
sumers shape the market,189 there is no obvious reason that
the terms must exist as contract; as long as they are available
to a consumer who is affirmatively searching for information
about a company policy, those analyses are easily applied.  In
fact, nothing in standard accounts clearly requires the policies
be available at all.  If I can consent to be surprised by what is in
my unread contract,190 why can I not consent to be surprised
by the whims of my cable company191 or by the mysterious
algorithms of my credit card lender’s APR fluctuations?192
Hiding terms on purpose is clearly a fanciful idea, but there
are intermediate steps with more practical appeal.  As a first
step, courts could start by letting go of assent analysis for
peripheral terms in contracts of adhesion.  Courts could take a
uniform approach to consumer contracts, stepping back from
the granular, fact-specific inquiries that have characterized the
doctrinal parsing of browsewrap, clickwrap, and terms that
186 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 16, at 1183 (arguing that “[i]f contracts rest on R
consent, then parties should be able to consent to be bound by hidden terms.”).
187 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 256 (1960)
(suggesting that in standard form contracts, non-reading parties may be deemed
to have assented to “any not unreasonable or indecent terms . . . which do not
alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms”).
188 See Barnett, supra note 103, at 636 (2002) (“Suppose I say to my dearest R
friend, ‘Whatever it is you want me to do, write it down and put it into a sealed
envelope, and I will do it for you.’  Is it categorically impossible to make such a
promise?  Is there something incoherent about committing oneself to perform an
act the nature of which one does not know and will only learn later?”).
189 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
630–32 (1979) (showing that even if most non-drafting parties do not know the
terms of their agreements, as long as a fraction of consumers do read and select
on favorable terms, terms will not be unfairly one-sided).
190 See Barnett, supra note 103, at 636 (arguing that assenting to be sur- R
prised, clearly permissible under standard assent doctrine, is the equivalent of
assenting to unread terms).
191 See, e.g., Eric Andrew Horwitz, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions
as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75,
75 (2006) (“Imagine entering into a year-long contract for cable service . . . .
According to the cable company, the subscriber agreement contains a provision
stating: ‘We reserve the right to change the terms of the contract at any
time . . . .’”).
192 See, e.g., Ellen Cannon, How To Avoid the Credit Card Nightmare of Univer-
sal Default, FORBES (May 27, 2011) https://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder
/2011/05/27/how-to-avoid-the-credit-card-nightmare-of-universal-default/
[https://perma.cc/8SYK-ZRQU] (explaining a particularly vicious version of the
APR algorithm in which default on a separate and independent loan obligation
can trigger a higher interest rate in a credit card agreement).
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follow.  A term may be enforceable or unenforceable, but the
justification for either would no longer rest on the text on the
back of a receipt or the failure to make customers click “I
Agree” before purchase.  At this point, I take no strong position
of what theory of standard terms would undergird this move.
Courts could, roughly, take one of two approaches to assent.
In Hill v. Gateway, Judge Easterbrook implies that everyone is
always on notice of terms, because all agreements are under-
stood to be subject to terms.193  As such, individual notice
should be irrelevant.  The other approach would look more like
the Discover Bank v. Superior Court opinion from the California
Supreme Court, which declares that a contract of adhesion is
itself enough evidence of procedural defects to trigger scrutiny
into the substantive unconscionability of a term.194  Again, if
all form contracts are suspect, courts could stop inquiring into
the particulars of a specific form contract.195  If the courts were
to jettison assent on either theory, the unconscionability review
would then focus entirely on the substantive fairness of the
disputed term.  Defects in the bargaining process would be
irrelevant to the determination of fairness, whether on a back-
ground understanding that consumers are always on notice
that terms exist or that they are never on notice of their terms.
The goal is that assent to consumer contracts is treated across
the board such that it requires no analytic space—and thus
offers no incentives to firms to produce it.  If courts do not pay
attention to notice of standard terms, companies risk less by
leaving them out; changing the assent analysis changes the
incentives.
It is worth noting here, though this Article cannot do the
topic justice, that the discourse of assent affects the political
conversation around unfair terms.  The assent question is dis-
tracting; it obfuscates what ought to be a robust debate about
what firms can and cannot do.  If the question is whether or not
firms ought to be able to require customers to bring their
claims in arbitration, that determination could be made on its
own terms.  Either that is something firms ought to be able to
do or it is not; there is no intervening fantasy about the con-
sumer agreeing to arbitration.  We might think that consumers
could use the political process to register their opposition to
193 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir. 1997).
194 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
195 I hasten to add that this is not the approach of the Discover Bank court,
which identifies a low threshold for procedural defects in any contract of adhe-
sion, but still endorses a sliding scale approach.
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unfair terms.  If the cultural status of consumer contracting is
framed mainly as a debate over procedural fairness, those ob-
jections may be less likely to crystallize into something politi-
cally actionable.
2. Low Costs of Overreach
There are two sides to the boilerplate-incentives coin.  The
first is that when courts and legislatures inquire carefully into
assent/disclosure but only facially into substantive fairness,
rational drafters who know that their counterparties are not
reading should include any term that has a positive value to
them.  This is the argument of the last subsection, that focus
on assent leads to overproduction of terms.  The other side of
the coin is that our current enforcement regime imposes no
real costs to firms that overreach.  When Discover Bank in-
cludes an unenforceable restriction on class actions, a disap-
proving court invalidates the term—but not the contract.196
The defendant in that case pays no real costs—if the worst
thing that will happen is that the term will get thrown out,
there is no reason not to include it and hope for the best.  This
is a real problem on two levels.  The first is that firms may be
deterring legitimate, serious actions this way.  Recall the Stolle
& Slain finding about the personal injury disclaimer at the
gym.  If a company knows that some parties with high-stakes
claims will forbear from bringing suit just on the basis of the
contract language alone, the firm stands to benefit from the
inclusion of the unenforceable term.  The second problem is the
more general observation that it does nothing to stem the tide
of boilerplate.
The right goal in this area ought to be to find ways of
policing contracts of adhesion via legal mechanisms that deter
firms from trying to informally legitimize unfair terms.  The
policy prescriptions deserve full and separate treatment
outside of this Article, but I can sketch out some of the most
promising practices.  One route is to subject firms to civil fines
when they include unenforceable terms in their contracts.  In
California, for example, the ban on anti-disparagement clauses
comes with a monetary penalty up to $10,000 for any firm that
attempts to enforce such a term.197  Legislation introduced in
both the Senate and the House, called the Consumer Review
196 Discover Bank, supra note 194, at 1116–17. R
197 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8 (2015), also referred to as the “Yelp” bill.
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Freedom Act, has also received support.198  When terms are
not explicitly forbidden by statute, courts may nonetheless be
persuaded to address them in terms of fraud.  A firm that
knowingly includes an unenforceable term in a contract with
the intention of deterring legal or extralegal challenge might be
properly understood to be engaging in a form of fraud, which
subjects the firm to liability in tort.  The Federal Trade Com-
mission has shown willingness to adopt this kind of reasoning
in other consumer protection contexts, particularly false adver-
tising (a very close relative).199  Finally, even without legislative
authorization to impose penalties, courts may nonetheless take
the more forceful measure of invalidating not only unenforce-
able terms but the broader deals that contain them.  A firm that
risks a voided term risks very little; a firm that risks a voided
contract because of the one bad term has a more serious calcu-
lation to make.  Interventions that target unfair terms may be
most effective if they make clear that firms that get it wrong—
firms that include terms that a court deems unenforceable—
will suffer real costs.
CONCLUSION
Consumer contracting has an uneasy status in modern
American culture and contemporary legal doctrine.  Given the
sheer number of standard term texts, and their unprecedented
length, it should not be surprising that readership is almost
nil.  Even so, in the case law and in the popular culture, the
notion that reading fine print is a reasonable and laudable goal
persists.  Thus far, interventions have been focused largely on
increasing the salience of important terms, even as these ef-
forts have repeatedly failed to increase consumer understand-
ing.  This Article offered some experimental evidence that
efforts to increase consumer access to terms may paradoxically
inhibit substantive objections to those terms.  The intuitive
moral norms of contracting appear to apply even when assent
is very thin and formalistic.  As such, even terms clearly vul-
nerable to challenge may receive an unwarranted level of defer-
ence in the shadow of the law.
198 See Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2015, S.2044, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2044 [https://
perma.cc/5DPV-NF33].
199 See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Weigh the Label, Not the Tractor: What
Goes on the Scale in an FTC Unfairness Cost-Benefit Analysis, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1999, 2005 (2015) (describing a fraud approach to an analysis of false
advertising).
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Under the current doctrine, an analysis of procedural fair-
ness in consumer contracting attends to the particulars of the
contracting situation in ways that elide the larger reality of
unreadness and unreadability, and that elision has doctrinal
and cultural consequences.  By contrast, if contracts have no
standard terms, consumer-firm transactions can be analyzed
earnestly and transparently.  When terms are absent, it is ar-
guably clear to all parties that they are not meant to be discov-
ered ex ante.  In such a regime, the difference between insiders
and outsiders diminishes.  And, in turn, when the terms or
policies appear problematic or unfair, there are no social or
moral obstacles to raising a challenge—the terms have no spe-
cial promissory status.
Assent to unread fine print is a live legal debate, one that is
currently receiving real political and analytic attention.  The
proposals to sharpen the back-end scrutiny of terms for unfair-
ness are particularly apt for this context, where consumers are
unlikely to evaluate terms before assent.  But if consumer con-
tracts of adhesion are going to be explicitly and systematically
cleaved from the larger body of contract law, there is an oppor-
tunity to face the assent fiction head-on, taking into account
the effect of contract law on non-expert or outsider participants
in our legal system.  The current regime requires firms to dis-
close every term they hope to later enforce, and consumers to
attest that they agree to those terms if they want to purchase
the good or browse the site.  Courts and scholars understand
that this simulacrum of meaningful assent is in tension with
the underlying principles of contract enforcement, but one
would never know as much by reading the case law or the
contracts themselves.  The fresh attention to consumer con-
tracting provides a moment to ask not only whether people are
reading their contracts but also what they make of these un-
read contracts—and, finally, how those judgments and choices
affect the normative appeal of our contract law.
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APPENDIX
STUDY REPLICATION WITH AMAZON TURK SUBJECT POOL
300 subjects were recruited from Amazon Turk.  Subjects
were paid $1 to complete a 5-7 minute questionnaire.  3 sub-
jects were omitted from the sample because they took the sur-
vey twice; 294 observations are reported here. 50.3% of
subjects were men, with ages ranging from 19 to 72 with a
median age of 32.
TABLE 1.








Legal 5.7 5.7 4.7*** 
Fair 4.1 3.6 3.2** 
Blame Customer 5.3 5.2 4.1*** 
Blame Agency 3.8 3.7 4.5* 
Consent 5.9 5.5 4.7*** 
Moral 5.2 5.1 4.1*** 
Communication 3.7 3.7 2.9* 
Sue 3.3 3.7 4.0+ 
Legitimate 4.2 4.3 3.4** 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; *** p <.001 
Significance tests show p-values for Wilcoxon rank-sum
comparisons of each variable in the Rolling Contract and On-
line Policy conditions with the same variable in the Standard
Contract condition.
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TABLE 2.
MEANS, WAIVER SCENARIO, STANDARD CONTRACT VS.







Legal 5.1 4.7 3.9*** 
Fair 3.4 3.4 2.5** 
Blame Customer 4.7 4.2+ 3.2*** 
Blame Hotel 3.9 4.2 4.7*** 
Consent 5.8 5.4 4.0*** 
Moral 4.5 4.3 3.2*** 
Communication 3.6 3.2 2.4*** 
Sue 5.1 5.1 5.4 
Legitimate 3.6 3.4 2.8** 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; *** p <.001 
Significance tests show p-values for Wilcoxon rank-sum
comparisons of each variable in the Rolling Contract and On-
line Policy conditions with the same variable in the Standard
Contract condition.
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